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THE REAL SEXUAL REVOLUTION:
POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN
INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades, the number of legal questions
arising from medical and scientific advances has grown exponen-
tially.' Increasingly complex questions regarding the essence of
life and the relative importance of the rights of different persons
as related to that life2 have required courts to delve much deeper
into philosophical, religious, and scientific analysis3 than they
I See Maurizio Mori, Is a 'Hands Off Policy to Reproduction Preferable to Artifi-
cial Intervention?, in CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
ASSISTED PROCREATION 99, 99 (Donald Evans ed., 1996); Note, Sperm, Spleens, and
Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 693-95 (1995); see also GEORGE P. SMITH, II, BIOETHICS AND
THE LAW: MEDICAL, SOCIO-LEGAL, AND PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAVE
NEW WORLD 117 (1993); Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of
Society's Most Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation
System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 46 (1995); Barry Brown, Reconciling Property Law
with Advances in Reproductive Science, 6 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 73, 73 (1995); Rich-
ard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Examination of Property Law and Biotechnology,
32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1167, 1168 (1995); Walter Wadlington, Artificial Conception:
The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 465 (1983); Comment, Cryopre-
servation of Human Embryos: A Scientific Advance, A Judicial Dilemma, 24
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 707,707 (1990).
2 According to Black's Law Dictionary, "life" is defined as, inter alia: "[The] state
of... humans... in which.., natural functions and motions are performed, or in
which... organs are capable of performing their functions. The interval between
birth and death. The sum of the forces by which death is resisted." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 923 (6th ed. 1990). As this definition reveals, the nebulous concept of
life will not easily conform to the rigors of legal rules.
3 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992); ROBERT H. BLANK,
REDEFINING HUMAN LIFE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND SOCIAL POLICY 1
(1984); Michael Kirby, Medical Technology and New Frontiers of Family Law, in
LEGAL ISSUES IN HUMAN REPRODUCTION 3, 3-4 (Sheila McLean ed., 1989); Machelle
M. Seibel, Medical Evaluation and Treatment of the Infertile Couple, in
TECHNOLOGY AND INFERTILITY: CLINICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL
ASPECTS 11, 32 (Machelle M. Seibel et al. eds., 1993) (recognizing the legal and ethi-
cal considerations of infertility treatments). See generally COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
HUMAN ARTIFICIAL PROCREATION (1989) (discussing the ethical, scientific, and legal
implications of the latest reproductive technologies in Europe); Bartha M. Knoppers
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have been willing and required to in the past.4 Judges are in-
creasingly faced with the conundrum of reconciling our common
law traditions, relying upon the evolution of legal concepts from a
historical perspective, with scientific advances that now freely
criss-cross the demarcations of life and death that were previ-
ously felt to be solid and relatively bright lines.5 This is particu-
larly true in the realm of reproductive technology, 6 an area that
the scientific and medical communities dove into with virtually
no legal restraints or regulations. 7 There is now available a wide
range of techniques to aid couples who are unable to have chil-
& Sonia LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted Conception: Lega Ethical
and Social Issues, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 329 (1991).
4 When they have been unable to circumvent the question, courts and legisla-
tures have defined the term "life" in a variety of ways that allowed them to resolve
the issue at hand without treading too far into uncharted socio-religious arenas. For
example, traditionally, criminal homicide statutes required that the fetus be "born
alive" to be deemed a "person" within the meaning of those statutes (subsequently,
some legislatures specified that a fetus was included for purposes of criminal stat-
utes). See Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LOY. L. REV. 357,
369-77 (1986). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has often used a fetus "viabil-
ity standard" when faced with questions regarding the constitutionality of abortion.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its progeny. Viability, however, is becom-
ing an out-dated standard as technology progresses. See Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); PETER SINGER & DEANE WELLS, MAKING
BABIES: THE NEW SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF CONCEPTION 117 (1985) ("The period in
which it is necessary for the human fetus to be in its mother's womb is shrinking
from both sides."). Finally, most probate codes (based on the Uniform Probate Code)
require that an heir survive the decedent for at least 120 hours to be considered a
person, alive at the time of decedent's death, for inheritance purposes. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-104 (1983).
5 See RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY, 140-41 (1981).
The point of divergence between the two most opposed and basic truths of
existence, life and death, is not exactly identifiable, as we assumed in the
past. Death is not what it used to be. The invention of... the ventilator
and the respirator, plus the skill of the transplant surgeon, have forced us
to change our perception of death, and have illuminated our inability to say
unequivocally what death is, or, conversely, what life is.
Id.; see also BLANK, supra note 3, at 1; Brown, supra note 1, at 73 (noting that medi-
cal research is looking forward whereas our legal system looks to the past).
6 See ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, PROCEED
WITH CARE: FINAL REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 1 (1993) (describing "a revolution in reproduction").
7 The need for legal restrictions and guidance in this area is repeatedly asserted.
See id. at 1 (declaring that reproductive technologies offer new opportunities but
must be controlled); Zelda Pickup, Selective Reduction, Abortion and the Law, in
REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE AND THE LAW 33, 38 (A. Allan Templeton & D. Cusine
eds., 1990) ("Reform or re-examination of existing statute law to take into account
modern medical technology and practice is required.").
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dren naturally,8 or more controversially, to aid living persons to
parent a child using a deceased partner's frozen gamete (sperm
or eggs) or embryo.9
Control of reproductive materials, and the rights of children
that are subsequently conceived, have been at the epicenter of an
increasing number of legal battles.10 Putting aside the ethical
questions of a child being born after the death of one or both bio-
logical parents," and the administrative difficulties this situa-
tion creates, issues stemming from rights in reproductive mate-
rial invariably involve a dispute over proprietary rights12 that is
frequently interwoven with questions of custody and inheri-
tance.13
Recently, a wide range of technological advances have
spawned issues regarding property rights in the human body.14
8 See PART I infra.
9 Cryopreservation, used in concert with any of a number of available reproduc-
tive assistance procedures, can result in a posthumously conceived child, i.e., a child
which is not yet in the pregnancy stage of development at the death of one or both
biological parents.
10 See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989); Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993); Estate of Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536 (Ct. App. 1992);
Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1991); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279
Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (Ct.
App. 1986); In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1977); Estate of Gordon, 501 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sur. Ct. 1986); In re
Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780
P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877 (S.C. 1987); Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
" For a comprehensive analysis of these issues see E. Donald Shapiro & Bene-
dene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem Insemina-
tion, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229,246-49 (1986-87).
12 See York, 717 F. Supp. 421 (between fertility clinic and gamete providers);
Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (between decedent's girlfriend and his children); Kass v.
Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997), affd, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (between
divorcing spouses); Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (between divorcing spouses).
'3 See Anna J., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (granting custody to gamete providers as
against surrogate mother); Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (awarding visitation
rights to sperm provider and holding him responsible for child support); In re Mar-
riage of Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635 (11. 1990) (holding husband of woman artificially
inseminated by donor sperm liable for child support); C.M., 377 A.2d 821 (acknowl-
edging sperm provider as legal father); Gordon, 501 N.Y.S.2d 969 (holding that chil-
dren born to the decedent's son's wife by artificial insemination using donor sperm
during her marriage to decedent's son, are issue of decedent's son for inheritance
purposes).
14 See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991) (corneas re-
moved for transplant during autopsy); York, 717 F. Supp. 421 (ownership of frozen
embryos); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Ca., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (in banc)
1999]
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Whether the issue involves ownership of one's own body parts,15
property rights in a decedent's human material,16 the validity of
a patent based on another person's unique genetic information,17
ownership or custody of embryos or gametes, 18 or the parentage
of a child of artificial conception, 19 the preliminary underlying
questions are the same. They include: "Is (Was) there a property
right?", "What are the implications for recognizing a right?", and
if there are multiple conflicting rights, "Who has the superior
right?" These questions take on a heightened level of sophistica-
tion and magnitude when they involve the fate of children post-
humously conceived using modern reproductive technologies. 20
The issues arising from posthumously conceived children can
be divided into two categories-rights prior to gestation (i.e.,
(patenting cells); Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (ownership of frozen sperm for possible
posthumous conception).
15 See, e.g., Moore, 793 P.2d at 479 (holding that a leukemia patient does not
have a property right in his spleen and bodily tissues to bring an action in conver-
sion against the medical center and doctors who patented his cells and used them in
lucrative medical research).
16 See, e.g., Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 484 (holding that a decedent's wife did not
have a property right in her deceased husband's corneas that would allow her to sue
the state for a due process violation when they were removed after an autopsy in op-
position to his religion).
17 See, e.g., Moore, 793 P.2d at 492-93 (validating doctors and medical clinic's
patent on leukemia patient's cells).
Is See, e.g., York, 717 F. Supp. 421; Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275; Kass v. Kass,
663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997), affd, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis,
842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992);.
19 See Estate of Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 536 (Ct. App. 1992); Anna J. v. Mark C.,
286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1991); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct.
App. 1991); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986); In re R.C.,
775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977); Estate of
Gordon, 501 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sur. Ct. 1986); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345
N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989);
In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877 (S.C. 1987); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (1987).
20 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 85 ("Should long-term embryo freezing
become a reality, a child might be born a century or more after the death of its ge-
netic parents. The child would grow up among the great-great-grandchildren of its
genetic brothers and sisters."); Monica Shah, Comment, Modern Reproductive Tech-
nologies: Legal Issues Concerning Cyropreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17
J. LEGAL MED. 547, 564 (1996) (acknowledging that legislation must regulate the
fate of preserved embryos when both parents are killed); see also JANET L. DOLGIN,
DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE
92 (1997) (commenting on the unique significance of the parent-child relationship);
Andrews, supra note 4, at 402-03 (acknowledging the complications extended pres-
ervation could create but disagreeing with recommendations that time limits be es-
tablished for how long gametes or embryos may be stored).
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rights to the reproductive genetic material) and rights post gesta-
tion (e.g., right to inherit, custody, and similar issues). This Note
covers both categories and provides general information on the
technology involved. Part I briefly explains the various current
and proposed medical techniques that assist couples who are at-
tempting to conceive a child. Part II explores the issues and cur-
rent state of the law as it relates generally to property and cus-
tody rights of reproductive materials. Part III elucidates the
issues raised by the potential birth of posthumously conceived
children, such as legally recognized parentage and inheritance.
This section also reviews the few decided cases on posthumously
conceived children, as well as the preeminent cases in other ar-
eas of reproductive technology that may be helpful by analogy,
and critically examines relevant statutes, such as the Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act. Finally, Part IV
asserts that the states must legislate soon to provide guidance on
the legal status of posthumously conceived children and proprie-
tary or custody rights in frozen gametes and especially embryos,
and offers a sample statute. This proposed statute attempts to
be flexible enough to allow the courts to fulfill the intentions of
the parties and adjust to constantly advancing technology, as
well as pass muster under a due process evaluation by the
United States Supreme Court.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT AND PROPOSED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES
Originally, all reproductive technology was developed as a
means to assist couples in overcoming infertility.21 To this day,
infertility is still the primary use of this technology;22 however, it
is also used by single women wishing to be mothers,23 homosex-
21 See Bernard M. Dickens, Reproductive Technology and the 'New' Family, in
FAMILY RIGHTS: FAMILY LAW AND MEDICAL ADVANCE 21, 23 (Elaine Sutherland &
Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1990); Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child
Relationship in an Age of Reproductive Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29
REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 55, 57-58 (1994).
2 See Kirby supra note 3, at 4; Wadlington, supra note 1, at 470-71.
23 Artificial insemination using donor sperm is a procedure employed by many
single women who want children. The status of the resulting child, however, is un-
certain in some states and the procedure is banned by statute in nineteen others. See
Kamran S. Moghissi, The Technology ofAID and Surrogacy, in NEW APPROACHES TO
HUMAN REPRODUCTION: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL DIMENSIONS 117, 129 (Linda M.
Whiteford & Marilyn L. Poland eds., 1989).
1999]
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ual couples wanting to have children,24 as well as both men and
women hoping to indefinitely prolong their reproductive
lifespan. 25 Discussed below is an overview of some of the most
widely-used assisted conception techniques currently available or
emerging.
A. Artificial Insemination
The oldest and most common form of reproductive technology
is artificial insemination.26 This simple process, which was
originally used in husbandry,27 evolved over hundreds of years,
becoming widespread in the 1960s. 28 This process consists of in-
serting sperm into the mother's uterus via a pipette while she is
ovulating.29 It is a relatively simple procedure that does not re-
quire a physician's assistance but, in fact, is usually performed
by one,30 especially if sperm from an anonymous donor is used or
if the parties wish to freeze sperm for future use.31 Additionally,
some states have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA")
24 See Kirby, supra note 3, at 4 (reporting "occasional reports of homosexual
partners who resort to the procedures to avoid heterosexual intercourse"). See, e.g.,
Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212; Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530; Karin T. v. Michael T.,
484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fam. Ct. 1985).
25 See Jeffrey Kiuger, Eggs on the Rocks, TIME, Oct. 27, 1997, at 105 (acknowl-
edging male and potentially female reproductive "insurance").
26 See McAllister, supra note 21, at 58 (citing Judith L.B. Rice, The Need for
Statutes Regulating Artificial Insemination by Donor, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055, 1055-
56 (1985)).
27 See THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, SURROGATE
PARENTING: ANALYSIS AND RECOMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 19 (1988)
[hereinafter SURROGATE PARENTING]; Moghissi supra note 23, at 117 ("Artificial in-
semination, first used for humans by John Hunter, a Scottish physician, at the end
of the eighteenth century, is a relatively simple procedure from a medical point of
view.").
28 See SURROGATE PARENTING, supra note 27, at 19 (1988) (citing 46 THE
ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN FERTILITY SOCIETY, ETHICAL
CONSIDERATIONS OF THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 36S (Sept. 1986)).
Others claim that artificial insemination in humans became a regular practice as
early as the 1940s and 1950s. See SCOTT, supra note 5, at 198.
29 See McAllister, supra note 21, at 59 (citing U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: PRACTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES: SUMMARY OF A 1987 SURVEY-BACKGROUND PAPER, OTA-BP-BA-48, 15
(U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1988)); SURROGATE PARENTING, supra
note 27, at 19 (1988).
30 See Wadlington, supra note 1, at 472.
31 See McAllister, supra note 21, at 59-60 (noting that under most statutes ad-
dressing this situation, physician assistance for AID is essential).
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which states that a physician must be utilized in order to cut off
all parental rights of the sperm donor.32 Those states may also
require, in accordance with the UPA, that to establish the
mother's husband as the legal father, a consent form must be
signed by both parties and the physician, and that it be recorded
with the state.33
When the sperm used in the procedure comes from the
woman's husband it is referred to as Artificial Insemination by
Husband ("AIH"); when it comes from a third-party donor it is
known as Artificial Insemination by Donor ("AID").34 An older
procedure, but one that is now virtually extinct, is Confused Arti-
ficial Insemination ("CAI"), where the husband's sperm is com-
bined with a donor's so that the actual fertilizing sperm is un-
known.35  While this allows the husband to embrace the
possibility that he is the child's natural father, and the law will
probably recognize him as such,36 it is being abandoned because
of the uncertainty it creates and the difficulties that arise in
identifying significant genetic defects and diseases which may af-
fect the child's health.37 The injected sperm used in artificial in-
semination can either be fresh or previously-frozen (cryopre-
32 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a), 9B U.L-A. 301 (1987) ("If, under the super-
vision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is insemi-
nated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is
treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived."); McAl-
lister, supra note 21, at 60.
33 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987) ("The husband's con-
sent must be in writing and signed by him and his wife. The physician shall certify
their signatures and the date of the insemination, and file the husband's consent
with the [state] ... ."). C.f., Alexandria S. v. Pacific Fertility Med. Ctr., Inc., 64 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 23 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that fertility clinic's failure to certify signature
of mother's husband is not actionable); In re Marriage of Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635,
639-40 (ll. 1990) (stating in dicta that the Illinois statute, patterned after the UPA,
could require the husband's consent be in writing for statutory presumption of pa-
ternity to arise).
3 See SURROGATE PARENTING, supra note 27, at 19 (1988); McAllister, supra
note 21, at 59.
35 See ATHENA LIU, ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 12
(1991); Wadlington, supra note 1, at 469.
36 See LIU, supra note 35, at 12 (noting that the husband may well be the bio-
logical father, however, this would not be known without a paternity test); Wadling-
ton, supra note 1, at 470.
37 See LIU, supra note 35, at 11-12 (noting that CAI diminishes the effectiveness
of AID which screens for mental and other hereditary diseases).
1999]
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served) sperm that has been carefully thawed to enhance the
survival rate.38
Although AH has generally been found, even in Victorian
England, to be a legally acceptable if somewhat unconventional
practice, AID has not fared as well.39 Often, the practice has
been labeled as adultery.40 Regardless, for some couples, par-
ticularly those facing male infertility, artificial insemination is
their only opportunity for parenthood.41 In addition, cryopreser-
vation of sperm allows a man to take out "fertility insurance" in
case his body sustains a trauma, leaving him unable to produce
sperm in the future;42 or if he dies wanting to father a child, the
sperm may be used posthumously through artificial insemina-
tion.
38 See Ex parte Blood, 2 W.L.R. 806, 814 (C.A. 1997) ("Sperm can be used fresh
or after it has been preserved."); McAllister, supra note 21, at 59 (citing U.S.
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION:
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF A 1987 SURVEY-BACKGROUND
PAPER, OTA-BP-BA-48, 10 (U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1988)).
39 See MARY WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON
HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY 19 (1985) (recounting the opposition to
AID and noting that in 1948 the Archbishop of Canterbury, who was highly critical
of AID but not AIH, recommended that AID be made a criminal offense); McAllister,
supra note 21, at 59-60 (noting that questions arise surrounding the legal relation-
ship between the child and the genetic father).
40 See Wadlington, supra note 1, at 477-78; see also Shapiro & Sonnenblick, su-
pra note 11, at 237 (noting that the court in Doornbos v. Doornbos adopted the rea-
soning that adultery laws were aimed at preventing children conceived with one
other than a spouse, not merely extramarital affairs).
41 See Wadlington, supra note 1, at 473 ("AID offers a possible answer for child-
seeking couples when the male partner is infertile.").
42 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 57 (noting that Alain Parpalaix had
deposited sperm after having learned that treatment for testicular cancer might
make him sterile); WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 54 (suggesting that a man may want
to preserve semen before undergoing physically traumatic medical procedures or be-
cause he is suffering from a condition that could make him sterile and further men-
tioning that in the future, women may have the same opportunity to extend fertil-
ity). Once freezing eggs becomes more widely available, "maternity insurance" will
also be available. Kluger, supra note 25, at 106. Cryopreservation was available to
astronauts in the 1960s in case space travel injured their reproductive systems. See
Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to Be Born? Legislative Inaction and the Post-
humous Child, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 993,995 (1996).
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B. In Vitro Fertilization (IVF)
The first successful human birth from in vitro fertilization
was in 1978. 43 Louise Brown of England was dubbed the first
"test-tube" baby.44 As early as 1957, however, successful testing
with mice showed in vitro fertilization to be a viable method of
reproduction.45 The process of in vitro fertilization ("IVF") begins
with the removal of a woman's eggs (oocytes) that have been
gathered by a needle aspiration or laparoscopy procedure46 either
during her normal menstrual cycle or after careful stimulation of
the ovaries using a series of hormone injections or oral medica-
tions.47 These eggs are then combined with either her husband's
or a donor's sperm in a culture dish containing fertilization me-
dium.48 The eggs are incubated in an environment that mimics
the fallopian tubes together with the sperm, which have been
specially treated so as to enhance their fertility.49 Ideally, within
a total of approximately 48 hours from the time the sperm and
egg are combined, a pre-embryo of between two and eight cells
will develop (a blastomere) which is then introduced into the
woman's uterus by catheter with the hope it will implant and
grow.5 0 Unfortunately, the current success rate for implantation
43 See LIU, supra note 35, at 8 (noting that the year 1978 was a watershed date
for in vitro fertilization); SCOTT, supra note 5, at 214.
44 See LIU, supra note 35, at 8 (stating that the child was born as the result of a
technological breakthrough); SCOTT, supra note 5, at 214 (noting that the birth at-
tracted attention comparable to that of the first successful heart transplant).
45 See JENNIFER GUNNING & VERONICA ENGLISH, HUMAN IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION: A CASE STUDY IN THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL INNOVATION 2-3
(1993).
46 See WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 29 n.2.
The laparoscope is an optical surgical instrument which is used to inspect
the internal abdominal and pelvic organs so that minor surgical procedures
can be performed including the recovery of one or more eggs from those
ovarian follicles that are ripe. Laparoscopy usually requires a general anes-
thetic but does not usually involve an overnight stay in hospital.
Id. Ultrasound techniques can now also be used to aid in egg recovery. See id. at n.3.
47 See BLANK, supra note 3, at 41; McAllister, supra note 21, at 60.
48 See McAllister, supra note 21, at 61; Seibel, supra note 3, at 29.
49 See SURROGATE PARENTING, supra note 27, at 21 (1988) (stating that the fer-
tilized eggs in the petri dish are incubated until they are ready to be implanted in
the uterus); BLANK, supra note 3, at 41-42; Sam Thatcher & Alan DeCherney, Preg-
nancy-Inducing Technologies: Biological and Medical Implications, in WOMEN &
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: MEDICAL, PSYCHOSOCIAL, LEGAL, AND
ETHICAL DILEMMSAS 27, 32 (Judith Rodin & Aila Collins eds., 1991).
50 See BLANK, supra note 3, at 28; Seibel, supra note 3, at 29.
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is low. Only about 60 to 80 percent of IVF attempts at fertiliza-
tion are successful and most of those do not result in pregnancy.51
To improve these odds, more than one pre-embryo is usually in-
serted.52 This practice, however, commonly results in multiple
pregnancies,53 requiring the treating physician to counsel the
mother on her options: to either abort some of the fetuses, or
carry all to term and risk losing them all or her own life. 54 Sto-
ries of such multiple births from related fertility treatments have
become increasingly common in the news. 55
The possible parental combinations from in vitro fertilization
suggest that controversies that could arise.5 6 For example, the
51 See McAllister, supra note 21, at 61; see also WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 30
(noting that while IVF fertilization is successful 75% of the time, abnormalities or
poor development of the embryos and complications in utero lower the possible num-
ber of successful births); Seibel, supra note 3, at 30 (quoting statistics that only 19%
of IVF procedures resulted in pregnancy and only 14% in live birth).
52 See WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 30 (reviewing the reasons for transferring
more than one embryo and analyzing the reasons for and against using such a pro-
cedure); Dickens, supra note 21, at 32; see also Pickup, supra note 7, at 34.
53 Unlike fertility drugs, which stimulate a woman's ovaries to release many
eggs during ovulation to increase the likelihood of a successful pregnancy through
normal sexual activity, in vitro procedures are physician-controlled, thereby reduc-
ing the number of multiple births above twins. See Seibel, supra note 3, at 30 ("Most
IVF centers do not transfer more than four of five embryos to reduce the risk of mul-
tiple births."); Gina Kolata, Many Specialists Are Left in No Mood for Celebration,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997, at A32.
54 See Dickens, supra note 21, at 32; Pickup supra note 7, at 34 (describing "se-
lective reduction of pregnancy" in multiple pregnancies arising from infertility drugs
or IVF); Pam Belluck, Progress Made By 7 Babies Encourages Their Doctors, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997, at A32; Kolata, supra note 53, at A32; see also WARNOCK, su-
pra note 39, at 30 (citing the potential for added risks from multiple pregnancy such
as miscarriage and premature delivery).
55 Most recently, America was awed by the 1998 birth of octuplets to a Houston
couple, see Mark Babineck 7 Plus 1 Equals a Rare Birth; Octuplets Are First Known
to Survive, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 21, 1998, at A3, available in 1998 WL 22240528,
and waited expectantly in 1997 for the McCaughey septuplets to be born in Calisle,
Iowa, see Belluck, supra note 54, at A32 ("[Tihe McCaugheys' startlingly successful
birth has been met with... celebration and wonder."); Kolata, supra note 53, at A32
("[Clelebrations and talk of miracles... swirled around the birth of septuplets in
Iowa on Wednesday"). While these multiple births occur most frequently when fer-
tility drugs are used, as was the case in Houston and Iowa, these drugs are often
used in conjunction with other procedures, such as IVF, which on their own often
result in multiple births when as many as six eggs are introduced into the uterus to
enhance conception odds. See supra note 52; Judy Peres, Giving Birth to Contro-
versy, CHI. TRIB., July 21, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 2878254.
56 See Susan L. Crockin, The Legal Response to the New Reproductive Technolo-
gies, in TECHNOLOGY AND INFERTILITY: CLINICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL, AND
ETHICAL ASPECTS 407, 407 (Machelle M. Seibel et al. eds., 1993) ("A child today may
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woman providing the egg is not necessarily the woman in whose
uterus the fetus will grow.57 Therefore, who is the child's
mother? In addition, the sperm may come from the mother's
husband or from a third-party donor. So who is the legal father?
Sometimes, so as to prevent the woman from having to undergo
painful stimulation and ova collection procedures monthly, the
physician or fertility clinic will cryogenically preserve fertilized
embryos. 58 Are those embryos the "property" of the egg donor,
the sperm provider, or on occasion, the fertility clinic? Who can
take them, use them, or destroy them? Who are the legal "par-
ents" of those embryos? In courtrooms today, these questions are
being asked and judges are struggling, usually unaided, for an-
swers.59
C. Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI)
This technique, which is a variation on IVF, only recently be-
came available to the public as an option and is still somewhat
controversial. 60 It is primarily used when the male partner's se-
men carries few or no sperm capable of reaching the egg.61 Dur-
ing this process, a single sperm is extracted, usually from the
epididymis, and is injected into the egg.62 There are critics who
have as many as five 'parents'-a biological father and mother, a gestational mother,
and a rearing father and mother."); see also WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 37 (ob-
serving that egg donation was the first circumstance in which the woman providing
the genetic information was not the person who would give birth to the child).
67 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 96 (discussing "full surrogacy," or
"rent-a-womb," in which the embryo carried by the surrogate does not contain any of
her genetic information).
58 See id. at 82-83 (noting that surgery to collect eggs, "the most invasive part of
the IVF procedure," does not need to be performed monthly using cryopreservation of
embryos and that some patients become ill or bleed from the uterus aier this sur-
gery).
59 See DOLGIN, supra note 20, at 32. "Faced with the startling consequences of
surrogacy and the new reproductive technologies, legislators have been slow to in
responding, and courts, uncertain about how to react but compelled to do so anyway,
have as a group behaved with confusion and ambivalence." Id. at 176-77.
60 See Peres, supra note 55, at 1 (revealing that the American Society for Repro-
ductive Medicine declared this procedure "no longer considered experimental" when
less than 100 conceptions have occurred and the oldest children conceived using this
procedure are six and would not yet reveal the abnormalities).
61 See Denise Grady, New Ways to Help Sperm Get Up and Go, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 1999, at G12.
62 See id. at G12; Delthia Ricks, Infertility, NEWSDAY, Feb. 7, 1999, at H22,
available in 1999 WL 8156139.
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argue that despite this procedure's seeming effectiveness at re-
sulting in a viable pregnancy, it should not be used because it can
perpetuate birth defects carried by the weak sperm that nature
would ordinarily prevent.63
D. Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT)
Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer ("GIFT") is another very
similar procedure to in vitro fertilization, with one exception.64
Using the same methods available for in vitro fertilization, eggs
and sperm are collected from the parents or donors.65 The differ-
ence occurs in the site of fertilization. During in vitro fertiliza-
tion, the egg and sperm are united in a petri dish and the re-
sulting embryo is allowed to divide several times before
implantation in the uterus is attempted. 66 During a GIFT proce-
dure, the egg and sperm are inserted together by catheter di-
rectly into the fallopian tube,67 where it is hoped fertilization will
occur.68 Since the fallopian tubes are where normal fertilization
takes place, this is an attempt to help mother nature along, and
to prevent the uterine rejection common with in vitro fertiliza-
tion.69
GIFT was first introduced in 1984, and by 1987 had sur-
passed in vitro fertilization success rates.70 It appears that
GIFT's success rate, coupled with cryopreservation techniques,
increases the likely prospect for having a successful birth long af-
63 See Peres, supra note 55, at 1.
64 See McAllister, supra note 21, at 63-64.
65 See id. at 64.
66 See DIEDERIKA PRETORIUS, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: A WORLDWIDE VIEW
OF THE ISSUES 5 (1994); McAllister, supra note 21, at 60-61 (citing INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, MEDICALLY ASSISTED CONCEPTION: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 3, 2, 18
(1989)).
67 Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer ("ZIF") mirrors the GIFT procedure and is-
sues, the only difference being that during ZIFT, an embryo is created outside the
body and allowed to divide until it reaches the zygote stage before being inserted
into the fallopian tube. See Ricks, supra note 62, at H22.
68 See McAllister, supra note 21, at 64 (citing INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
MEDICALLY ASSISTED CONCEPTION: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 3, 19 (1989)).
69 See id.
70 See id. at 63-64 (citing Machelle M. Seibel, M.D., A New Era in Reproductive
Technology: In vitro Fertilization, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer, and Donated
Gametes and Embryos, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 828, 833 (1988); INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, MEDICALLY ASSISTED CONCEPTION: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 3, 19
(1989)).
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ter the gamete collection occurs. Ultimately, the same parent-
hood and property issues will arise with GIFT as those raised by
in vitro fertilization, only at a more frequent rate, reflective of its
successfulness. 71
E. Cryopreservation
Cryopreservation is not a reproductive assistance method it-
self, but is used in connection with in vitro fertilization, GIFT,
and artificial insemination procedures. This specialized tech-
nique of deep freezing slows down the activity, and therefore the
aging cycle, of living matter to a point where it virtually stops
time for these organisms.72 For example, the procedure for
"freezing" embryos involves first exchanging all water in the em-
bryo for a special preservative to prevent the formation of tissue-
damaging ice crystals, and then exposing it to a succession of liq-
uefied gases to cool the embryo to -1961C, 73 at which point it can
be stored, theoretically, for hundreds of years.74 When the em-
bryo is to be used, it is slowly thawed, rinsed of the preservative,
and re-hydrated. 75 Then the normal in vitro fertilization proce-
dure is followed, and the embryo is inserted into the mother's
uterus.
Cryopreservation allows for the long-term storage of sperm
(approximately ten years without damage),76 eggs (duration un-
known),77 and embryos (theoretically six hundred years).78 As a
71 See id.
72 See infra note 182 (testimony of Jerome Lejuene). Cryogenics is a branch of
physics that involves the study of materials at very low temperatures; cryobiology is
the study of effects of low temperatures on biological systems. See SINGER & WELLS,
supra note 4, at 84. Cryobiology was originally developed to preserve and store or-
gans for transplants, but currently the technology allows only for the effective stor-
age of small organisms of very few cells, such as embryos. See Moghissi, supra note
23, at 123 (explaining that cryobiology techniques for humans were a result of dis-
coveries made to improve animal husbandry).
73 See McAllister, supra note 21, at 63.
74 According to one report, embryos could be stored for up to 600 years. See
SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 81.
75 See McAllister, supra note 21, at 63.
76 See Elizabeth Ann Pitrolo, Comment, The Birds, The Bees, and the Deep
Freeze: Is There International Consensus in the Debate Over Assisted Reproductive
Technologies?, 19 HOUS. J. INTL. L. 147, 151 n.18 (1996) (citing Toby Solomon &
James B. Boskey, Who Owns the Ova?, 141 N.J. LAW. 20,20 (1991)).
77 See id. at 151.
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result, through one harvesting of eggs a woman may become
pregnant several times throughout her life and could have chil-
dren born to a surrogate after her death.79 Men can now also
parent children throughout their lifetime, and after death by
freezing sperm or contributing sperm to a preserved embryo.
Cryopreservation is the technology that makes possible posthu-
mously conceived children.
F. Embryo Lavage and Transfer and Surrogate Motherhood
In an embryo lavage and transfer procedure, instead of fer-
tilizing a donor egg in a petri dish and inserting it into the
mother's uterus like in IVF, the egg is fertilized in the body of a
paid donor through artificial insemination.80 The resulting em-
bryo is then removed and inserted into the mother's uterus with
the hope that it will embed and grow.81 The major drawback to
this procedure is the possibility that the donor may later choose
not to give up the embryo or, more likely, the removal of the em-
bryo will be unsuccessful and the donor will end up with a preg-
nancy intended for the donee mother.82 Currently, this is an
available, but not widely used procedure.8 3
Whereas artificial insemination is usually associated with
male infertility, in vitro fertilization, GIFT, embryo lavage and
78 See id. at 151 n.18 (citing Solomon & Boskey, Who Owns the Ova?, 141 N.J.
LAW. 20, 20 (1991)).
79 See Kluger, supra note 25, at 105; Pitrolo, supra note 76, at 154.
80 See WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 39; McAllister, supra note 21, at 64 (citing
Machelle M. Seibel, M.D., A New Era in Reproductive Technology: In vitro Fertiliza-
tion, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer, and Donated Gametes and Embryos, 318 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 828, 833 (1988)).
81 See WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 39; McAllister, supra note 21, at 64-65 (cit-
ing Machelle M. Seibel, M.D., A New Era in Reproductive Technology: In vitro Fer-
tilization, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer, and Donated Gametes and Embryos, 318
NEW ENG. J. MED. 828, 833 (1988); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICALLY ASSISTED
CONCEPTION: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 3, 19 (1989)).
82 See WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 39 (recognizing the risks to the egg donor);
McAllister, supra note 21, at 65 (citing Machelle M. Seibel, M.D., A New Era in Re-
productive Technology: In vitro Fertilization, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer, and
Donated Gametes and Embryos, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 828, 833 (1988). See gener-
ally Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting the surrogate
mother refused to give up the child of the donor parents as the time of birth neared).
83 According to one statistic, there are four reported successful births and two
ongoing pregnancies attributed to embryo lavage and transfer. See McAllister, supra
note 21, at 65 (citing Leonard Formigli, M.D. et al., Donation of Fertilized Uterine
Ova to Infertile Women, 47 FERTILITY & STERILITY 163, 163 (1987)).
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transfer, and surrogate motherhood are attempts to overcome
female infertility. In vitro fertilization, GIFT, and embryo lavage
and transfer are all used when the fallopian tubes, the site of fer-
tilization, are damaged or not properly functioning.84 Alterna-
tively, surrogate mothers are used when the uterus is unable to
sustain a pregnancy.85
As is commonly known, a surrogate mother agrees, usually
for a fee or as a family member,86 to carry and give birth to some-
one else's child.87 Ordinarily, the preferred procedure for surro-
gacy is in vitro fertilization, using the genetic mother's egg and
her partner's sperm.88 This creates a child that is truly the ge-
netic offspring of the two gamete providers, and should help to
avoid any legal questions as to who are the child's parents.8 9
Alternatively, if eggs from the donee mother are unavailable,
artificial insemination of a surrogate mother using the sperm of
84 See BLANK, supra note 3, at 41; see also SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 14
(noting that operations to repair damaged fallopian tubes are also performed in
some situations, with a 30% success rate).
85 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, 98-99 (noting that there are additional
medical and nonmedical reasons why a woman might employ a surrogate);
WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 42.
86 See Linda M. Whiteford, Commercial Surrogacy: Social Issues Behind the
Controversy, in NEW APPROACHES TO HUMAN REPRODUCTION: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL
DIMENSIONS 145, 146 (Linda M. Whiteford & Marilyn L. Poland eds., 1989) (quoting
recent statistics that estimated that the cost of most surrogacy contracts are
$20,000: $10,000 to the surrogate and $10,000 to the broker plus all expenses, in-
cluding doctors' and hospital bills). See, e.g., Anna J., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 372 (noting
that, "Anna," the surrogate mother for two gamete providers, was to be paid $10,000,
have a $200,000 insurance policy on her life, and presumptively, all of her medical
bills paid by the donor couple whose child she carried). See also Sandra Anderson
Garcia, The Baby M Case: A Class Struggle Over Undefined Rights, Unenforceable
Responsibilities, and Inadequate Remnedies, in NEW APPROACHES TO HUMAN
REPRODUCTION: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL DIMENSIONS 198, 207 (Linda M. Whiteford &
Marilyn L. Poland eds., 1989) (citing the fact that Mary Beth Whitehead, the surro-
gate, would receive $10,000 for being artificially inseminated and carrying the baby.)
87 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 95; WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 42;
Whiteford, supra note 86, at 146.
88 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 113. When a surrogate agrees to carry
the embryo of the gamete providers but not contributing her own egg, it is "Full sur-
rogacy." See Sandra Anderson Garcia, Surrogate Mothering in the Marketplace: Will
Sales Law Act as Surrogate for Surrogacy Law?, in NEW APPROACHES TO HUMAN
REPRODUCTION: SOCIAL AND ETICAL DIMENSIONS 170, 170 (Linda M. Whiteford &
Marilyn L. Poland eds., 1989). The surrogate agrees that once the baby is born, she
will relinquish parental rights and "allow the couple to adopt the baby." Id.
89 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 96, 113.
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the donee mother's partner could be performed.90 Ultimately,
surrogate motherhood has the potential to result in even more
confusion, heartbreak, and uncertainty as to legal parenthood
than donor in vitro fertilization or artificial insemination.91 But,
if all goes as planned, it could provide an infertile couple with the
much sought-after opportunity to be parents. In addition, surro-
gacy could be used in combination with cryopreservation of an
embryo, to allow a bereaved widower to father a child of his de-
ceased wife.
G. Cytoplasm Transfer
Cytoplasm transfer is a new procedure to repair defective
eggs, and is used in conjunction with in vitro fertilization.92
During a cytoplasm transfer, ooplasm, the liquid surrounding the
nucleus of the egg, is taken from a donor egg and injected, along
with the father's sperm, into the mother's egg.93 Then, the regu-
lar in vitro fertilization procedure is followed. 94 The difference is
in the genetic information. In an ordinary in vitro fertilization
procedure where the mother's eggs are defective, a donor egg is
fertilized by the mother's partner's sperm and then inserted into
her uterus.95 Cytoplasm transfer, on the other hand, uses the
woman's own egg with her genetic information, except that the
ooplasm is substituted; thus, the child has the genetic makeup of
the couple.96 As of 1997 this new technique had resulted in only
two pregnancies; however, researchers believe it will become
common in the future, particularly for women who have already
tried other fertility techniques.97
Once freezing eggs becomes a more widespread practice,
women who have had difficulty conceiving because of structurally
90 "Partial surrogacy" is the term for surrogate arrangements that involve artifi-
cial insemination. See Garcia, supra note 88, at 170.
91 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 101 (noting the "horrendous legal tan-
gles" surrogacy promotes and recounting distressing examples of failed surrogate
contracts).
92 See Cytoplasm Transfer, READER'S DIG., Dec. 1997, at 126.
93 See id.
9 See WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 35 (explaining that in traditional egg donor
situations, the donated egg is fertilized in vitro with the sperm of the infertile
woman's husband and then implanted in her uterus).
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defective eggs may be able to have them preserved so that the
eggs can later be repaired through cytoplasm transfer, transfer of
the nucleus to a viable egg, or another procedure. The ability to
repair eggs, combined with cryopreservation, will most likely
create and prolong the period over which children of these
women may be born. In addition, it may increase the already
substantial market for donor eggs, particularly once freezing on a
large scale allows for indefinite preservation.98 This prospect
treads rather heavily into the highly controversial area of the
commercialization of reproductive materials. 99
H. Cloning
Although not yet performed,10 human cloning has been sug-
gested as another option available to infertile couples. 0 1 The
first reported successful "cloning," which is the creation of an al-
most exact genetic replica of the "parent" or gene donor,10 2 was
performed in Scotland in 1997 in the widely publicized story of
the little lamb "Dolly."'103 Within a month and not to be outdone,
American researchers announced their successful cloning of a
98 See Pitrolo, supra note 76, at 155 (reporting that egg donors currently receive
between $800 and $1,200 per retrieval cycle and acnowledging that a successful
technique to freeze eggs will broaden the feasibility of using donor eggs); see gener-
ally Kluger, supra note 25, at 106.
9 See SURROGATE PARENTING, supra note 27, at 2 ("Pioneering techniques to
freeze gametes and embryos may... radically alter the circumstances of human re-
production and present a new arena for commercial activity."); Bonnie Steinbock,
Sperm as Property, 6 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 57, 65-66 (1995). One result of this ad-
vance in technology is the recent trend toward soliciting donor eggs from Ivy League
students, under the erroneous assumption that the resulting children will also be
Ivy League material. See Joseph Berger, Yale Gene Pool Seen as Route to Better
Baby, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1999, at 1.
100 But see Panel Casts Doubt on Human Cloning Claim, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
1999, at Al (reporting that in December scientists "had replaced the nucleus of a
woman's egg with the nucleus of one of her body cells" and then fertilized the egg
and allowed it to divide into four cells, thus completing the "first step" towards hu-
man cloning).
101 See Cloning Erap, BUS. DAILY, Feb. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5444194
("Dr. Richard Seed... says that cloning is the answer to the prayers of sterile cou-
ples who want to have babies.").
102 See Ronald Kotulak, First Mammal Is Cloned, CH]. TRIS., Feb. 23, 1997, at 1
(defining cloning a mammal as making a genetically identical copy from a single
body cell); Chad Reed, Finding the Facts in Science Fiction, YORK DAILY REC., Mar.
7, 1997, available in 1997 WL 6090125 (defining cloning as the production of identi-
cal copies of animals).
103 See Kotulak, supra note 102; Reed, supra note 102.
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Holstein bull months earlier.10 4 Research continues despite the
extremely heated moral, ethical, and religious concerns sur-
rounding this topic. 10 5 In January 1998, Dr. Richard Seed an-
nounced his plan to pursue human cloning as an infertility
treatment alternative.10 6 Using this method, the genetic infor-
mation of one parent 10 7 is inserted into an embryo that had its
genetic information previously removed, and the child is then
carried by the mother or a surrogate. 08 This technique would
provide infertile individuals or couples with a child that is virtu-
ally an "identical twin" to the donor parent, except for the inter-
vening years.109 Critics assert, among other things,110 that clon-
104 ABS, however, the American biotechnology company responsible, conceded
that they had not used an adult cell to clone a Holstein bull, which was the case with
Dolly, but they felt they had the technology. Successful cloning using an adult cell
was thought to be virtually impossible prior to Dolly. See Wisconsin Company Says
It Has Cloned Holstein Bull, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minn.-St. Paul), Aug. 7, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 7576963.
105 See Ashley Cheshire, A Brave New World Is Here, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Mar. 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4825030; Douglas Dunn, Editorial,
Exactly What Does Cloning Create? SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 1, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 3119706 (criticizing the current tone of dialogue about cloning as an in-
sult to all identical twins); Jerry Hereden, Cloning Could Mean Double Trouble,
TULSA WORLD, Mar. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3629983 (criticizing cloning any
living, breathing creature as being not morally right); Kotulak, supra note 102
(stating that cloning is frighteningly alien to our most cherished concepts of you and
me and that it could change human evolution). For some comic relief see Bob Harris,
Second Thoughts About Cloning Humans, THE HUMANIST, May/June 1997, at 43
(noting that some feel cloning could create an ethical quagmire about its use in hu-
mans).
106 See Alexander Morgan Capron, Slow Down the Rush to Human Cloning,
BUFF. NEWS, Feb. 22, 1998, at H4, available in 1998 WL 6000064 ("Chicago physi-
cist Dr. Richard Seed announced that he plans to open a Human Clone Clinic and
has several couples lined up to use his services.").
107 There would be only one genetic parent (male or female) of a clone and a sur-
rogate mother. The parental relationships this creates would likely be more complex
than it appears. See Reed, supra note 102.
10os According to one particularly skillful, yet comprehensible, explanation:
The mammary cell is then inserted into an unfertilized ... egg cell that has
had its own genetic material removed. Fusing the cells tricks the egg cell
into thinking it has become fertilized. Then, the researchers believe, the
chemical machinery inside the egg cell goes to work to reprogram the
[adult] cell genes into starting over again, as if they were for the first time
brought together as sperm and egg. The cell divides, produces an embryo,
fetus and newborn that grows into a copy of its adult donor.
Kotulak, supra note 102. It has been suggested that the embryo implantation proce-
dure for clones will be quick and easy, not even requiring anesthesia. See Cloning
Erap, supra note 101.
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ing procedures will not be restricted to infertile couples, but will
be available to anyone who would prefer to have a replica of
themselves rather than a child with its own unique genetic
make-up, which, the experts strongly assert, is not the purpose of
reproductive technology."'
Despite its critics and political unpopularity," 2 it appears
that the only real obstacle to the practice of human cloning is
time.113 When human clones are finally created, the legal issues
109 See Cheshire, supra note 105 ("Differences in age and experience will sepa-
rate them from us 'originals' and from themselves. In fact.... we will finally answer
the question of whether factors such as environment and experience are more impor-
tant than heredity in the development of the human organism."); Reed, supra note
102. The difference in age also raises the inevitable legal question: Is a clone an heir
for inheritance purposes? See Chesire, supra note 105. Also, there are the questions
as to who will raise the clone and be responsible for him/her. The gene donor is a
good candidate; the surrogate mother might claim guardianship; the state may as-
sume protection as it would an orphaned child; or the researcher who produced the
clone might take responsibility. See Reed, supra note 102.
110 See Banning Federal Funds for Human Cloning Research: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Technology of the House Comm. on Science (1997), available in WL
11235877 (testimony of Dr. Hessel Bouma HI) (stressing the religious and moral
dangers of cloning).
W See id. (stating that in contrast to human person-cloning, animal, plant or
microbial cloning are quite beneficial).
112 Currently, the only state to have a law against cloning is California; which
provides that human cloning will be punished with a $250,000 fine. See Cloning
Erap, supra note 101. Republican and Democratic senators are battling not over
whether cloning should be banned, but over which party's "clone banning" bill will be
adopted. In the meantime, cloning is still legal since the Republican bill has been
filibustered and the Democratic bill has not gotten off the ground yet. See Mara Bov-
sun, GOP Human Cloning Bill Bumped Off Fast Track By Senate Vote,
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Feb. 16, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 875052.
Although the U.S. has not yet banned human cloning research like many of its
European neighbors, "the U.S. government prohibits taxpayer dollars from being
spent on human cloning research." Kotulak, supra note 102.. In addition, the Na-
tional Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction has studied human cloning and
concluded that it provides no benefit to human society. See id. In Japan, the Educa-
tion Ministry recently cited ethical problems for why it has decided, for the time be-
ing, not to allocate any government funds to human cloning research. Cloning ex-
periments on mice and cattle, however, continue. See Ministry Decides Not to Fund
R and D on Cloning Humans, JAPAN POLY & POL., Mar. 10, 1997, available in 1997
WL 8243335.
113 See Cheshire, supra note 105; Cloning knowledge 'close to completion,' SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 21, 1998, at 13 ("Dr. Richard Seed... said yesterday
knowledge on human cloning might be complete within two months if current ex-
periments on calves and monkeys showed positive results."); see also Cloning Erap,
supra note 101 ("According to [Dr. Seed], he is almost near to perfecting his process
that will enable him to produce as many as 200,000 human clones a year. The initial
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will be sweeping and unprecedented. These issues, however, will
be very similar to those surrounding the development of artificial
insemination. In addition, cloning takes posthumous conception
to the extreme. As well as being able to have yourself cloned
more than once within your lifetime, you could be cloned once or
repeatedly after death without the need to freeze sperm or em-
bryos, thereby throwing the probate and social security laws into
a tailspin. This situation will cause moral and ethical dilemmas,
and confound our legal system. This Note does not attempt to
present or resolve any of the complicated issues cloning raises,
however, one possible preemptive measure is to begin answering
somewhat related questions now, as they apply to artificially and
posthumously conceived children, through legislative enact-
ments.
II. PROPRIETARY/CUSTODY RIGHTS IN HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE
MATERIALS
Courts have been struggling with issues related to reproduc-
tive technology since the 1940s 114 with little or no legislative
guidance. 115 Beginning in the 1970s, and escalating into the
1990s, the number of legal problems has risen due to the wide-
spread availability and use of advanced reproductive techniques.
At the same time, according to some statistics, the fertility rate
in America has steadily dropped, 116 with recent studies revealing
cost will be high-as much as a million dollars, but subsequent clones will cost much
less."). Other scientists argue that the technology that created Dolly is "extremely
inefficient and not ready for humans." Bovsun, supra note 112, at 1. They feel that
the possibility that Dr. Seed, or anyone, will be able to create fertility clinics is slim.
Other scientists have expressed doubt that human cloning will ever be achieved. See
id.
114 See Andrews, supra note 4, at 357-58 (citing the judicial precedent that has
developed in relation to IVF and related reproductive technologies).
115 See DOLGIN, supra note 20, at 62 ("Legislative responses are neither compre-
hensive or timely.").
116 See 76 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 95 (113th ed. 1993) (showing a steady decline
in the "intrinsic rate of natural increase" for fertility rates in the U.S. from 1970 to
1989); id. at 76 No. 96 (displaying a predicted decline in the number of expected
births in the U.S. from 1992 to 2010 in all races except Asian and Pacific Islanders).
But see Gary B. Ellis, Public Policy and the New Technologies, in TECHNOLOGY AND
INFERTILITY: CLINICAL, PSYCHOSOCIAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ASPECTS 403, 404
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that there are at least 2.4 million American couples afflicted with
fertility problems. 117 Courts continue to face a seemingly endless
stream of first impression cases involving the rights of mothers
and (especially) fathers, 118 surrogate mothers, 119 egg donors,120
sperm donors, 121 homosexual 22 and heterosexual unmarried
partners,1' husbands and wives, 124 fertility clinics and sperm
banks,125 potential relatives,'126 children of artificial conception, 127
and more. Courts have generally taken the view that the court
in such situations sits in equity'2 and they have merged what
limited statutory guidance exists and somewhat related case law
with legal principles and concepts of equity.1' This has resulted
(Machelle M. Seibel et al. eds., 1993) (stating that a national center for health statis-
tics survey has found that infertility rates appear not to have changed).
117 See Seibel, supra note 3, at 11; see also Dickens, supra note 21, at 24 (com-
menting on the fact that "Itihe full extent of infertility is not known because many
infertile people do not seek to conceive children.").
118 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973)
(finding mothers ex-husband must consent to present husband's adoption of child
born of AID during first marriage); Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct.
1948).
19 See, e.g., Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375-76 (Ct. App. 1991); In re
Baby M., 525 A.2d. 1128 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1987).
120 This is such a new development in assisted reproductive technology that it
has not yet caused notable legal battles. However, it almost certainly will. See
Crockin, supra note 56, at 410 ("An even newer area of uncharted legal territory in-
volves donor eggs.").
121 See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986); In re
R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct.
App. 1989).
122 See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991); Jhordan
C., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530; Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fain. Ct. 1985).
123 See, e.g., C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977).
124 See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997), aff/d, 696 N.E.2d
174 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
225 See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
12 6 See, e.g., Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993) (siblings); Es-
tate of Gordon, 501 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sur. Ct. 1986) (grandparent's estate).
127 See, e.g., Alexandria S. v. Pacific Fertility Med. Ctr., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23
(Ct. App. 1997) (holding that child conceived by AID cannot bring a cause of action
against fertility clinic for failure to certify mother's husband's signature on consent
form).
128 See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591 ("[T]here can be no easy answer .... [We
must weigh the interests of each party to the dispute, in terms of the facts and
analysis set out below, in order to resolve [the] dispute in a fair and responsible
manner."); see generally DOLGIN, supra note 20, at 178-82 (stating that courts have
adopted an "intent" approach in an attempt to balance traditional concepts of family
with the situations generated by the new technologies).
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in a patchwork approach that provides few assurances to the
substantial number of couples entering into these procedures, to
the clinics and doctors who treat them, or to the children who are
conceived through them. 30
Usually when a fertilization procedure is abandoned due to
divorce, 1 1 relocation, 13 2 or other reason stemming from the par-
ticipants, the issues begin (and in many cases end) with deter-
mining who should be allowed to take possession of and make de-
cisions regarding the remaining vials of sperm or the individual
embryos that have been cryogenically frozen. Many courts have
recently faced this previously unknown dilemma, particularly in
the area of frozen embryos. 133
A. Possession and Disposition of Embryos
Prior to the introduction of in vitro fertilization, and more
significantly cryopreservation, there was little question that an
embryo belonged to the woman who was carrying it.34 If she was
married, the law presumed that her husband was the father for
inheritance and custody purposes, but generally did not grant
him power of possession or disposition over the embryo. 13 5 We
129 See DOLGIN, supra note 20, at 176-77 (noting that courts have either by-
passed statutory law altogether because of its inapplicability or attempt to torture
the statute into conforming to situations that were never imagined at the time of en-
actment); Crockin, supra note 56, at 407.
130 See Crockin, supra note 56, at 407.
131 See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997), affd, 696 N.E.2d
174 (N.Y. 1998); Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588.
132 See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
133 See, e.g., York, 717 F. Supp. at 422; Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581; Davis, 842
S.W.2d at 602 n.25; see generally Garcia, supra note 88, at 183 ("Fetuses and babies
may become the focus of ongoing legal battles.").
134 See WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 56 (stating that the existence of embryos
outside of the mother's uterus has initiated questions of"ownership" but that "own-
ership" of embryos should not be permitted, only a right of use and disposal in the
donor couple (or the storage facility)); Anne Helium, Legal Regulation of New Repro-
ductive Technologies: Continuity and Interconnectedness versus Freedom and Jus-
tice, in BIRTH LAW 109, 110 (Anne Helium ed., 1993).
135 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(finding that husband's interest in the embryo did not rise to the level of allowing
him to veto a woman's choice to have an abortion); see also Knoppers & LeBris, su-
pra note 3, at 336 (noting that while the father's paternal interests have tradition-
ally received some protection, that protection generally depended on a "live birth").
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have entered a brave new world,136 however, in which fertility
clinics and doctors have become third parties to the conception
process and where we can now sustain an embryo outside of the
mother. This has opened the door to new types of disputes sur-
rounding the fate of embryos, 13 7 such as control over embryos,
custody of embryos, 138 rights to initiate a pregnancy,139 aban-
donment issues, and intestate, inheritance, and succession is-
sues.140
The concept of the embryo as property was explored in 1989,
before Judge Clarke of the Eastern District of Virginia. Specifi-
cally, the issue was whether a fertility clinic was required to for-
ward a cryopreserved embryo to another clinic at the request of
the relocating parents.141 In York v. Jones,1 the court found
that a bailment had been created and that, therefore, the clinic
was required to follow the instructions of the embryo's "own-
ers." 143 Dr. and Mrs. York had argued a cause of action in de-
tinue, which required, inter alia, that the plaintiffs show "a prop-
erty interest in the thing sought to be recovered,... [that] the
property is capable of identification,... [and that] the property
must be of some value."1 The court found these requirements
136 See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932) (describing an eerie future
in which technology is all controlling, morality is turned on its head, and society is
structured through genetic engineering).
137 See Crockin, supra note 56, at 407 ("For the first time, conception has been
taken out of a woman's body .... Moreover, third parties are now actual partici-
pants and not merely assistants in procreation.").
138 See Donna A. Katz, My Egg, Your Sperm, Whose Preembryo? A Proposal for
Deciding Which Party Receives Custody of Frozen Preembryos, 5 VA. J. SOC. POLY &
L. 623 (1998).
139 See WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 56-57 (recommending that if the parties
cannot agree on how to use the embryo, the storage facility gains the right to deter-
mine how to use or distribute the embryos). The Warnock Committee also recom-
mended that at the end of ten years without use, the embryos pass automatically to
the storage facility. See id. at 56. But see Andrews, supra note 4, at 404-05 (noting
the psychological damage to progenitors that could occur if their embryos are given
to another couple to use against their wishes).
140 See WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 56 (recommending that if one donor dies,
the right to use or dispose of the gametes goes to the surviving spouse, and if both
die, the right passes to the storage facility).
141 See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 422 (E.D. Va. 1989).
142 717 F. Supp. 421.
143 See id. at 425, 427.
144 Id. at 427.
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had been satisfied and, in doing so, impliedly defined the embryo
as "property."145
The York decision has not inspired uniform adoption of its
approach by other courts, and a split of authority has emerged. 146
In the prominent case of Davis v. Davis 47 the trial and interme-
diate courts treated the dispute over seven embryos as a battle
for "custody."148 Davis was originally a divorce proceeding which
had progressed without incident until the question of the em-
bryos was raised. 49 Mary Sue Davis, the wife, wanted to be al-
lowed to keep the embryos and continue trying to become preg-
nant; Junior Lewis Davis, the husband, wanted them left in their
frozen state until he decided whether he wanted to become a fa-
ther in this manner.1 50 The trial court determined that the em-
bryos were "human beings" and awarded custody to Mary Sue,
along with a court directive that she be allowed to implant the
embryos in an attempt to" bring these children to term.' "151 The
Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that Junior had a constitu-
tional right not to father children where no pregnancy has oc-
curred. 152 In addition, the Court of Appeals found that the par-
ties had a joint interest in the fate of the embryos and therefore
awarded joint custody. 153
By the time the case reached the Tennessee Supreme Court,
Mary Sue and Junior had both remarried and their positions had
changed; Mary Sue wanted to donate the embryos to a childless
couple, and Junior wanted the embryos discarded. 54 After not-
ing the scarcity of guidance in this area, either from statute or
case law, the court discussed the various approaches currently
145 See id.; see generally SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 88 (stating that 90%
of couples surveyed who have embryos frozen believed the embryo to be their "prop-
erty").
146 Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121 to 9:133 (West 1991) (granting em-
bryos status as persons) with Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (stating
that embryos are neither property nor persons).
147 842 S.W.2d 588.






154 See id. at 590.
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being advanced in legal journals155 and the opinions set forth by
the American Fertility Society.156 The focus of the court's opinion
was split between the legal status of an embryo157 and "[t]he
[right of [pirocreational [a]utonomy."158 The court distinguished
York v. Jones and determined that the embryo holds a unique po-
sition somewhere between that of property and of a human be-
ing.159 The court also concluded that a desire not to father chil-
dren from cryogenically-preserved embryos was protected under
the constitutional right to privacy, which the United States Su-
preme Court has interpreted to include a right to choose whether
or not to procreate. 160 In the end, the court upheld Junior's right
not to father children' 6' and directed the fertility clinic to dispose
of the embryos in accordance with its normal procedure and the
court's opinion.162
The Davis case highlights one of the fundamental arguments
cryogenically-frozen embryos raise: Are these children? This, in
turn, raises the always difficult questions: what is a human be-
ing and when is "life" created and when should it end?163 Unfor-
tunately for the legal and scientific communities, as we race into
the next millennium, we are moving at a dizzying rate toward
the point where deftly avoiding these questions with superficial
and malleable answers will no longer be an adequate solution.
155 See id.
156 See id. at 593.
157 See id. at 594-95 (expanding on the " 'Person' vs. 'Property' Dichotomy"); see
generally SINGER & WELLS supra note 4, at 88-89 (suggesting that embryos could be
treated as property and then discussing King Solomon's solution, splitting the child
which would result in divorcing couples each having one set of identical twin em-
bryos, or in the alternative, abandoning the property categorization and instead
wage a custody battle).
158 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598.
159 See id. at 596-97; see also WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 56 (concluding that
the right of a donor couple to use and dispose of embryos is limited but failing to es-
tablish how it is limited and instead simply urging donors to act responsibly).
160 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see
also Crockin, supra note 56, at 408 ("The United States Supreme Court has long rec-
ognized that the right to procreate is one of a very few 'fundamental' rights and
therefore deserving of the utmost protection and respect.").
161 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601-03.
162 See id. at 604-05.
163 See generally Knoppers & LeBris, supra note 3 (arguing that embryos are
always life, and as such need legal protection from commercialization and research).
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The complexity and immediacy of this situation will escalate as
increasingly more children are conceived after the death of a par-
ent. Who has the right to determine the fate of an embryo whose
parent is dead?
The ethical questions associated with the storage and de-
struction of embryos are apparent and have long been debated.
For some, the destruction of these embryos is equivalent to abor-
tion, while for others it is the prevention of a potential pregnancy
which never occurred. In an unusual case, Del Zio v. Columbia
Presbyterian Medical Center,164 a woman was awarded $50,000 in
damages for emotional distress sustained when a doctor dis-
carded the contents of a petri dish, which included the woman's
egg and her husband's sperm, intended for later use in in vitro
fertilization. 165
At present, neither the York court's property approach to
embryos nor the "in-between" approach of the Davis court is the
universally-accepted standard.166 In the first New York case on
the subject, Kass v. Kass,167 a 3-2 majority of the Appellate Divi-
sion reversed a lower court's finding that Mrs. Kass should be
allowed to retain and use frozen embryos after her divorce.16
Mr. Kass wanted the embryos to be donated to the fertility clinic,
as per the informed consent document that both had signed when
joining the in vitro fertilization program.169 Under the informed
consent document, the Kasses agreed that if the couple was un-
able to make a decision regarding the disposition of the embryos,
the clinic would retain the embryos for research.170 Initially,
Mrs. Kass had not objected, but, after filing for divorce, she
changed her mind and requested that she be allowed to use the
remaining embryos for future pregnancy attempts. 171 The trial
court found for Mrs. Kass, and made the strained analogy that "a
husband's procreative rights in a situation involving in vitro fer-
tilization were no greater than in the case of an in vivo fertiliza-
164 No. 74 Civ. 3558, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978).
165 See id. at *11.
166 See Shah, supra note 20, at 555 (asserting that most courts have taken the
Davis interim approach).
16 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997), aff'd, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
168 See id.
169 See id. at 583.
170 See id.
171 See id. at 584.
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tion, such that those rights essentially terminated at the moment
of fertilization."172
On appeal, there was unanimous consensus that "[a]
woman's... control over her own body [was] not implicated in
the IVF scenario until such time as implantation actually oc-
curs."173 The court split, however, on the interpretation of the
consent documents that the Kasses had signed.174 A two-judge
plurality concluded that the Kasses had demonstrated an intent
to donate the embryos in the consent documents. 7 5 In a concur-
ring opinion, Justice Friedmann cited Davis and found that Mr.
Kass's desire to not be a parent was sufficient to trump Mrs.
Kass's desire to have children in this case, regardless of intent.7 6
The two dissenting justices did not find that Mrs. Kass had a
conclusive right to the embryos; instead they felt that the consent
documents were not dispositive of intent and would have re-
manded the case "to flesh out the record so that the parties' re-
spective interests and burdens may be evaluated and a factual
determination may be rendered."177
The appellate court appears to have dodged the entire ques-
tion of property versus person by resolving the issue based on
contract interpretation. In addition, the opinion is carefully
phrased in order to side-step the whole controversy by expressly
avoiding words like "custody" or "ownership."178 Thus, in New
York, the questions as to whether a frozen embryo is considered
property that can be controlled and distributed as such, or
whether it is an entity over which custody must be granted, or
possibly even whether it is a legal person with undeniable rights,
remain unanswered. 7 9
172 Id. at 585.
17S Id. at 586.
174 See id. at 595 (Miller, P.J., dissenting).175 See id. at 597 (Miller, P.J., dissenting).
176 See id. at 592 (Friedmann, J., concurring).
177 Id. at 601. Like the court in Moore v. Regents of California, the dissenters in
Kass felt that the embryos should be treated as sui generis where the achievement of
policy goals should be the fimdamental driving force. See Moore v. Regents of the
Univ. of Ca., 793 P.2d 479,495 (Cal. 1990).
178 The court uses the word "control." E.g., Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 586, "the
woman who provides the eggs does not have the sole right to control the embryos'
fate" (emphasis added).
179 Louisiana has bestowed on embryos the ability to sue and be sued, similar to
"persons." See Andrews, supra note 4, at 399. Louisiana has also banned the sale of
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The discussion of whether an embryo is a person, property,
or something in-between, inevitably leads to related moral prob-
lems. The fate of frozen embryos raises questions that provoke
legal, medical, scientific, philosophical, religious, moral, and ethi-
cal debate. While some religions refuse to authorize even artifi-
cial insemination as a permissible practice,180 even the most
"progressive" religions have a difficult time condoning the de-
struction or complete de-humanization of frozen embryos. 181
From a moral and ethical perspective, it can be argued that
maintaining embryos in a frozen state of suspended animation is
equivalent to torture, and their destruction should be preferred
to stockpiling unused and unwanted embryos for an indefinite
period. 8 2 On the other hand, there is a substantial moral and
human ova, whether fertilized or not. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 1993);
Christine A. Djalleta, Note, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments to
the Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67 TEMP. L.
REV. 335, 340 n.47 (1994).
180 According to the Vatican:
Contraception deliberately deprives the conjugal act of its openness to pro-
creation and in this way brings about a voluntary dissociation of the ends of
the marriage. Homologous artificial fertilisation, in seeking a procreation
which is not the fruit of a specific act of conjugal union, objectively effects
an analogous separation between the goods and the meanings of marriage.
MICHAEL J. COUGHLAN, THE VATICAN, THE LAW AND THE HUMAN EMBRYO 5-6
(1990) (quoting Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dig-
nity of Procreation published by the Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith,
ch. II, sect. 4, p. 27). In sum, under strict adherence to Catholicism, in vitro fertiliza-
tion, artificial insemination donor, and most forms of artificial insemination hus-
band are "morally illicit." Artificial insemination would be permissible "only if it
serves to facilitate the conjugal act and is not a substitute therefor." COUGHLAN, su-
pra, at 6.
181 While Hasidic Jews contend that in vitro fertilization is only permissible be-
tween a husband and wife, Reformed Jews believe that "Jewish law permits high-
tech fertility methods, including the transfer of embryos." Marilyn Kalfus, Rabbis
Wrestle With Issues Raised by In-vitro Methods (last updated Apr. 22, 1996)
<rworld@link.freedom.com> (ORRegister) It appears, however, that the aim of both
is to continue the Jewish heritage, and needless destruction of embryos would seem
to be against the beliefs of either group.
182 See Edward Yoxen, Historical Perspectives on Human Embryo Research, in
EXPERIMENTS ON EMBRYOS 27, 27 (Anthony Dyson & John Harris eds., 1990); Access
Research Network, Origins Research Archives, What is in the Fridge?
<http'//www.arn.org/docs/orpages/or131/lejeune.htm> (Aug. 11, 1999) (transcript
of Dr. Jerome Lejeune's testimony at the Davis v. Davis trial). Dr. Lejeune, an ex-
pert witness for Mrs. Davis, testified that in his carefully considered opinion, em-
bryos are living beings and therefore, we do not have the option to destroy them. On
the other hand, Dr. Lejeune argued, leaving embryos in a frozen state is equivalent
to torture. He concluded that the only solution was to thaw and implant the embryos
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ethical issue in discarding a potential life.'8 In addition, as-
sisted reproductive technology procedures are expensive184 and it
is morally and ethically difficult to justify destruction of embryos,
which might be able to provide a less affluent childless couple
with the opportunity to be parents, simply because the donors no
longer have a need for them.
From a medical perspective, this procedure is aimed at
helping infertile couples, and while a doctor's duty is to protect
and enhance life, if forced to put the interests of an embryo on
the same level as that of their parents, assisting infertile couples
could become unduly burdensome.'18 Because cryopreservation
of embryos can improve the chances that an infertile couple will
conceive a child, 8 6 it is possible that this type of pressure on phy-
as soon as possible (recall, Mrs. Davis wanted to donate the embryos to infertile cou-
ples). Dr. Lejeune, a medical doctor and a well-known professor of genetics at the
Sorbonne in Paris, goes into lengthy descriptions of the actual freezing process and
its impact on the embryo. He explains the gradual and then rapid freezing of the
embryo and the reason that it works:
[I]f you diminish progressively temperature, you diminish the speed and
the number of collisions between the molecules, and so to speak... you are
progressively slowing down ... the temperature, you are freezing time ....
[Tbo freeze a cell, to have it entirely not moving, not respirating, not having
any chemical exchange, and... if you have done it with precision.... if you
thaw it... progressively and carefully, it will again begin to flourish and
divide .... [We have not arrested life and started life again. What we have
arrested is the time for this particular organism which is inside this can.
Id. at 8-9.
Dr. Lejeune is a world-renowned scientist who was responsible for uncovering
the extra chromosome that causes Down's syndrome in 1958. See Rayna Rapp,
Chromosomes and Communication: The Discourse of Genetic Counseling, in NEW
APPROACHES TO HUMAN REPRODUCTION: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL DIMENSIONS 25, 25
(Linda M. Whiteford & Marilyn L. Poland eds., 1989).
183 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 69-71 (exploring the right-to-life ar-
gument against the destruction of embryos and the counter-arguments).
184 For in vitro fertilization alone, the cost will usually be a minimum of ap-
proximately $4,750 per attempt. See id. at 18.
185 Infertility statistics differ, however, according to one survey; 8.5% of married
couples in America in which the wives were in their reproductive years were infer-
tile, "38.9% were surgically sterile and only 52.6% were believed potentially able to
conceive." Seibel, supra note 3, at 11. Excluding the surgically sterile individuals,
this survey concludes that there are at least 2.4 million American couples who are
infertile which "translates into nearly 2 million office visits for infertility annually."
Id. at 11-12. Clinical studies in England show from 10 to 15 percent of the married
couples in that country are infertile. See SCOTT, supra note 5, at 201.
186 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 82-83 (explaining that freezing allows
embryos to develop to a later stage and still be implanted during the ideal time in a
woman's cycle, thereby increasing the likelihood of successful implantation);
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sicians could ultimately prove detrimental to the couples seeking
treatment.
Expanding possibilities and lack of regulation in reproduc-
tive technology have energized researchers and laboratories.
Progressions in the field have been rapid. Placing responsibility
for every embryo created, however, could quickly dampen if not
drown this effort. 8 7 While some may see a decline in the pro-
gression as a positive retreat from "playing God,"'88 infertile cou-
ples and others genuinely benefiting from the frenzy would likely
see their hopes diminished.
Ultimately, the law must make a determination on the legal
status of an embryo. 8 9 Statutes will need to be enacted in every
state that interpret and synthesize the various positions into a
manageable, constitutionally-valid standard that reflects local
public policy, and that can be applied and defended. As yet, very
few statutes have been developed in this country or abroad in
this area.190 Since an embryo is a potential life, this is a highly
Moghissi, supra note 23, at 124-25 (citing various studies which show that artificial
insemination with frozen sperm has a 40 to 70 percent success rate).
187 See generally Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Examination of Property
Law and Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1167, 1210 (1995) (noting that both
the majority and Justice Broussard's dissent in Moore agreed that maximizing fumc-
tioning markets in bodily substances was their primary purpose).
188 See WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 9 ("[Tlhere is a body of opinion which holds
that it is wrong to interfere with nature, or with what is perceived to be the will of
God."). But see SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 26 ("God's will cannot be discov-
ered by simply assuming that it is in accordance with the way things have always
been done since in that case every innovation in history would have to be dismissed
as contrary to God's will.").
189 See Douglas J. Cusine, Experimentation: Some Legal Aspects, in
EXPERIMENTS ON EMBRYOS 122-23 (Anthony Dyson & John Harris eds. 1990)
(stating a long-held belief that legislative guidance is essential); Knoppers & LeBris,
supra note 3, at 335-36 (asserting that protection of the embryo must be "specifically
spelled out in law").
190 See GUNNING & ENGLISH, supra note 45, at 33 (noting that Australia was
the first country to enact in vitro fertilization and embryo research statutes in, The
Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984); Crockin, supra note 56, at 407 (noting
that Australia and Great Britain have established "national commissions to develop
guidelines for the assisted reproductive technologies"). See generally INTERNATIONAL
SURVEY OF LAWS ON ASSISTED PROCREATION (Jan Stepan ed. 1990); IN VITRO
DIAGNOSTIC MEDICAL DEVICES: LAW AND PRACTICE IN FIVE EU MEMBER STATES:
FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, SPAIN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (Bernard Maassen &
Robin Whaite eds. 1994); DEREK MORGAN & ROBERT G. LEE, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE
TO THE HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY ACT 1990: ABORTION & EMBRYO
RESEARCH, THE NEW LAW (1991).
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contentious topic. By using current technology a child could be
born today that was created after one or both "parents" are dead.
Therefore, decisions on the disposition and possession or custody
of frozen embryos can have monumental and long-lasting effects.
B. Possession and Disposition of Sperm and Ova
There have not yet been as many cases regarding possession
and disposition of the building blocks of the embryo, the sperm
and ovum, as there have been about the embryo itself. This may
be due in part to the fact that freezing human eggs, which in-
creases their availability and subsequently their quantity, is still
in the early stages of practicability.191 In addition, sperm does
not carry the same momentous moral uncertainty that surrounds
an embryo. 192 In fact, most would assume that sperm belongs to
the man from whose body it came.191 Gametes, however, are par-
ticularly unique and important human cells, and like other hu-
man materials, there is a legal reticence to categorize such items
as "property," freely alienable and freely inheritable. 194
The controversial case of Moore v. Regents of the University
of California95 reinforced the long held legal proposition that
human body parts are not property, in the conventional sense.196
John Moore, a hairy-cell leukemia patient at the UCLA Medical
Center had traveled from his home in Seattle to Los Angeles on
many occasions, prior to and after having his spleen removed, to
give "blood, blood serum, skin, bone marrow aspirate, and
191 See Kiuger, supra note 25, at 106.
IN See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 74-75 (discussing "[tlhe uniqueness of
the embryo" as differentiated from the egg and sperm).
193 See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 11, at 229.
194 See Shah, supra note 20, at 558 ("Because courts have been reluctant to con-
sider human body parts to be property, it is unlikely that courts would consider
gametes and preembryos to be property.") (footnote omitted). See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
274(e) (1994) (prohibiting the payment of fees for donating human tissue).
195 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
196 See id. at 489 ("[Ihe laws governing such things as human tissues, trans-
plantable organs, blood, fetuses, pituitary glands, corneal tissue, and dead bodies
deal with human biological materials as objects sui generis, regulating their disposi-
tion to achieve policy goals rather than abandoning them to the general law of per-
sonal property.") (footnotes omitted). See Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281
(Ct. App. 1993); Note, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property Right in Human
Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 220 (1990).
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sperm"197 samples for the alleged purpose of monitoring his
medical condition. 198 After eight years of these visits, Moore dis-
covered that the samples were not treatment-related but, in-
stead, the samples, as well as his spleen, were used in extremely
lucrative medical research because of their unique immunities. 199
Moore sued the doctors involved and the medical center for, inter
alia,200 conversion for their fraudulent removal, and for use of his
bodily substances for the doctors' and medical center's own
profit.201 The court, however, allowed Moore to go forward only
against his treating physician in an action for failure to obtain
informed consent.202 The court dismissed the other counts and
held that Moore could not sue in conversion because he had no
proprietary interest in his bodily substances, particularly his
spleen, as it was in his best interest to have it removed.20 3 The
California Supreme Court explained that allowing such a cause
of action could, among other things, inhibit scientific research se-
verely.204
Gametes, on the other hand, have been treated somewhat
differently than other bodily materials. Both sperm and eggs are
currently salable20 5 and there is a growing likelihood that they
are inheritable, or at least devisable if special provisions are
made. 206 Many legal scholars and the court in Hecht v. Kane,207
197 Moore, 793 P.2d. at 481 (internal quotations omitted).
198 See id.
19 See id. at 480-82.
200 There were 13 causes of action in the original complaint: "(1) 'Conversion'; (2)
'lack of informed consent'; (3) 'breach of fiduciary duty'; (4) 'fraud and deceit'; (5)
'unjust enrichment'; (6) 'quasi-contract'; (7) 'bad faith breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing'; (8) 'intentional infliction of emotional distress'; (9)
'negligent misrepresentation'; (10) 'intentional interference with prospective advan-
tageous economic relationships'; (11) 'slander of title'; (12) 'accounting; and (13) 'de-
claratory relief.' "Id. at 482 n.4.
201 See id. at 480-81.
202 See id. at 493, 497.
203 See id. at 491 n.32.
204 See id. at 493-97.
205 See generally SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 65-68 (discussing the argu-
ments for and against being permitted to sell gametes).
206 See Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Ct. App. 1993).
We conclude that at the time of his death, decedent had an interest, in the
nature of ownership, to the extent that he had decision making authority as
to the use of his sperm for reproduction. Such interest is sufficient to con-
stitute 'property' within the meaning of [the] Probate Code ....
Id. at 283.
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distinguish Moore and analogous cases that upheld genetic pat-
ents as against the specimen provider,208 from the rights a person
may have in their gametes. Also distinguishable are the wrong-
ful removal autopsy cases, generally finding no inheritable rights
in a decedent's body parts209 and the laws prohibiting the sale of
body parts for organ transfers. It appears that these distinctions
are attributable to: 1) the body's ability to continue generating
gametes, like blood, which can also be legally sold;210 and 2) the
fact that gametes, unlike diseased organs, are usually not re-
moved for a direct benefit of the individual, but instead are usu-
ally the result of a voluntary donation.211 It has been suggested
that, like the Davis interim category for embryos, gametes also
exist on a middle plane, exhibiting some of the characteristics of
property, such as control over disposition, while not embodying
the true and full meaning of "property."212
Ordinarily humans have very limited property rights in most
of their bodily substances and organs while alive, but it is rou-
tinely accepted that we may proscribe or prescribe what happens
to those parts upon death. For example, we may donate our body
to science; we may give a kidney to a relative; we may leave our
liver to a research organization; we may prohibit the permanent
removal of any body parts even if an autopsy is performed; we
may request that our heirs or executor decide how to allocate our
parts; and it appears we may even leave sperm or ova to a loved
207 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281-82. Hecht is the leading United States case to ad-
dress the issue of'posthumously conceived children.
208 See, e.g., Moore, 793 P.2d 479. The leading Supreme Court case establishing
the validity of patents on organic material is Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980).
209 See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991).
210 See Steinbock, supra note 99, at 65; see also SCOTT, supra note 5, at 190.
The tissue most widely bought and sold in the United States is blood. Pay-
ment is also made as a routine matter for urine, skin, and other body fluids
such as sweat, saliva, and semen. As long ago as 1970, the ongoing price for
blood was $10 to $15 per pint, and for semen somewhere between $15 and
$35 per ejaculation.
Id.
211 See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280 n.4, 282; see also Steinbock, supra note 99,
at 65 (acknowledging that "[siperm, unlike blood, is not lifesaving, nor necessary for
health").
212 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 87-88 (asserting that embryos and
gametes are neither people nor inanimate objects and can not be "owned in the ordi-
nary sense of that word.")
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one to conceive a child. An intention to leave any body part,
however, especially gametes, should be unambiguously ex-
pressed, preferably in testamentary form, if it is to withstand ju-
dicial scrutiny.
There are currently very few cases dealing specifically with
the issue of whether gametes can be bequeathed. The cases and
the extensive legal commentary that they generate,213 seem to
suggest that, while gametes may be "property" to the extent they
may be devised like other body parts, they are not innately in-
heritable. On the other hand, if they are not property, at least to
the extent of being capable of being given as a gift or bequeathed,
the question of posthumous conception, other than from an em-
bryo, becomes moot. While no state has yet enacted statutes de-
lineating a decedent's right to leave gametes for later procrea-
tion, current legal analysis and analogy to existing testamentary
rights in other bodily substances seem to show that such a right
does exist. Since these cases are becoming more common and
since gametes have long been treated as a commodity,214 laws
must be established that specify where all parties stand on the
issue of possession and disposition of gametes, especially where
the donor is deceased.
Hecht v. Kane215 is the only United States judicial decision to
date that has dealt with property rights in frozen sperm and the
possibility of posthumously conceived children by a non-spouse.
Significantly, the California Court of Appeals concluded that
gametes exist in a special category between property and person,
in which there are sufficient property rights to permit devise.2 16
The court distinguished the present case from Moore because of
the uniqueness of the issues raised by gametes. 217 Mr. Moore had
his diseased spleen removed and, at the time of most of the sam-
ple extractions, was afflicted with leukemia.218 Mr. Kane, how-
213 See, e.g., Steinbock, supra note 99, at 57; Jennifer Long Collins, Note, Hecht
v. Superior Court- Recognizing a Property Right in Reproductive Material, 33 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 661 (1995); Djalleta, supra note 179, at 335.
214 See Collins, supra note 213, at 675 (citing the American Fertility Society's
comments in the Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, which say that gam-
etes and concepti are the property of the donors, as well as the fact that sperm is
widely treated as property by medical professionals).
215 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993).
216 See id. at 283.
217 See id. at 280 n.4.
218 See id.
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ever, had voluntarily made deposits in a sperm bank with which
he had signed a "storage" agreement expressing his continued
ownership right; he paid for the sperm's storage; and expected
that he would get the sperm back if he paid a withdrawal fee.219
The court also cited statements by the American Fertility Soci-
ety: " 'It is understood that the gametes and concepti are the
property of the donors'" and they have the right to dispose of the
items as they choose, "'within medical and ethical guidelines' "220
provided there is no applicable legislation.
Whether gametes are property has generated polarized and
passionate opinions. 221 Some feel they should not be treated as
property in any way under any circumstances, i.e., not salable
and not devisable. These individuals feel it demeans human life
and is oppressive for those in desperate financial situations.222
Under this view, gametes could never be sold or bequeathed.
Others believe that all human body parts should be intrinsically
the property of the individual, to do with as he or she desires, es-
pecially when driven by dire economic conditions. From this per-
spective, to be truly free human beings we must have complete
dominion over our own bodies. Under this theory, gametes would
be salable and devisable without limit. A third perspective takes
the middle approach, asserting that gametes are never purely or
wholly property, but under certain circumstances and if intent is
clear, they may be both sold and devised. This approach con-
tends that we must work backwards: First look to what the party
wants done with the gametes, and then decide whether this
meets policy standards. If it meets policy standards, it is prop-
erty; otherwise, it is not.
The third approach, which is a variation of the Hecht deci-
sion, seems to be the most workable. It embraces the apparent
legal preference, in such highly personal areas, for adopting a
flexible middle-level approach.223 This method possesses the de-
219 See id. at 282.
220 Id. at 282, 283.
221 See Shah, supra note 20, at 558.
222 See id. (reporting that some feel that the sale of embryos and gametes is
equivalent to "slavery and baby-selling").
223 See Brown, supra note 1, at 74 (noting that courts and legislatures have been
reluctant to intrude into "private reproductive decisions" but have acknowledged
that there are some state interests which could be valid); see also Planned Parent-
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sirable combination of allowing gametes to be sold and be-
queathed given the proper conditions and preventing uses that
society finds offensive. 224 As it stands, however, with no applica-
ble statute, the third approach is far too dependent on the moral
or subjective perspective of the individual judge or doctor.225 The
first steps toward clarifying this hazy area of law are: clearly
stating when and how a decedent may leave gametes for posthu-
mous conception, when and how intent will be determined, when
and how gametes may be sold or given inter vivos, and when and
how proprietary claims may be made for gametes.
III. ISSUES AND RELEVANT LAWS ARISING FROM AND AFFECTING
POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN
When a child is conceived posthumously, that is, when preg-
nancy begins after the death of one or both parents, that child's
legal status is in doubt.226 As the law stands today, not only may
that child's conception be contested through a battle over the dis-
tribution of a decedent's gametes or frozen embryos, but once the
child is born, there is substantial doubt that child will be deemed
a legal descendant of the decedent. Similar to the confusion of
the early days of artificial insemination, there are no statutes to
clarify the status of these children or their parents. Unfortu-
nately, like illegitimate children and other children born with the
assistance of unconventional scientific methods, these children
may have to suffer through years if not decades of legislative in-
action or oppression, stripping them of their birthrights, as a re-
sult of the acts of their parents.
hood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (finding valid state interest suffi-
cient to surpass woman's interest in reproductive freedom).
224 E.g., unrestricted experimentation on embryos. See Cusine, supra note 189,
at 124-26 (exploring the arguments for and against allowing any experimentation
on embryos and concluding that some ought to be allowed within legislative guide-
lines).
225 "Whether an embryo is seen as 'life' or 'property' apparently depends on
where in the country, and before what judge or lawmaker, the disputing parties find
themselves." Crockin, supra note 56, at 409-10; see also DOLGIN, supra note 20, at
178-82 (explaining why the intent-based analysis of many courts is ineffective, in-
consistent, and may lead to results at odds with the true intent of the parties be-
cause of its subjectiveness).
226 See Brown, supra note 1, at 79 (noting that the death of both parents ignites
unique property considerations in relation to preserved embryos).
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Today there are more and more opportunities for, and thus
an increasing number of, children being born posthumously. It
appears, however, that most of these births have not been op-
posed and, therefore, no legal intervention occurred.227 As a re-
sult, issues regarding the legal status of the posthumously con-
ceived child and his or her parents remain unanswered for now.
Such issues include: the legitimacy status of the posthumously
conceived child; the need for a clearly expressed intent to have a
child posthumously for that child to be legally recognized;
whether a posthumously conceived child can inherit,228 collect so-
cial security, military service, and other benefits from the de-
ceased parent;22 whether the father's estate can be held liable for
support payments, whether a posthumously conceived child can
227 See, for example, the case of the Louisiana woman who asked for and was
granted social security benefits for her posthumously conceived child. This case, in
which the woman was impregnated three months after her husband's death, never
reached a courthouse. See Shah, supra note 20, at 561-62.
28 Inheritance issues surrounding posthumously conceived children abound. See
WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 54 ("[T]he evidence presented to us drew attention to
non-medical problems that may arise if frozen gametes or embryos are used after
prolonged storage. Serious legal complications may well arise, for example in rela-
tion to inheritance .... ."). The Warnock Commission also noted that "posthumous
fertilisation could cause real problems of inheritance and succession. Account would
have to be taken of issue who might be born years after the death." Id. at 55.
The inheritance issues include: (1) whether a child conceived posthumously is an
"heir" of the decedent, so that even if no financial provisions were made and there
was no explicit intention on the part of the decedent to have a posthumous child, the
child would take as a natural heir; (2) whether other children or heirs of the dece-
dent can contest the birth or status of a posthumous child because it could tie-up dis-
tribution of the estate or diminish their portion; (3) whether being posthumously
conceived cuts the child off from all inheritance rights from other members of the
decedent's family; see, e.g., Estate of Gordon, 501 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sur. Ct. 1986)
(holding that being born of AID does not preclude a child from inheriting from the
"paternal" grandfather even without the husband's written consent to the procedure
and even when the mother and her husband are no longer married as long as con-
sent was manifested at the time the procedure was performed); and (4) whether
members of the decedent's family inherit from the posthumously conceived child.
Moreover, there are the implications of both the common law Rule Against Per-
petuities and the probate requirement that an heir survive the decedent by 120
hours; and whether an individual's desire to reproduce posthumously is restricted
under the United States Constitution.
See Shah, supra note 20, at 561-62 (citing case in which Louisiana mother of
posthumous child was granted social security benefits for her daughter by the Social
Security Commissioner, despite finding by Social Security Appeals Council that she
was not entitled to the benefits because Louisiana law did not recognize posthumous
children as heirs of the deceased parent).
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sue for the wrongful death of the deceased pa.ent;230 and whether
a deceased person can be a "parent" with the affiliated rights and
responsibilities.
A. Significant Developments in the Common Law
The first case to address the fate of posthumously conceived
children was a 1984 French case, Parpalaix v. CECOS.31 Alain
Parpalaix, age 26, was dying of testicular cancer when he made
one deposit of sperm in CECOS, a government-run sperm
bank.232 At the time he was living with Corinne, whom he later
married, just two days before he died.233 After his death, Corinne
requested the sperm deposit from CECOS, which denied her re-
quest, adhering to their policy not to release sperm to anyone but
the donor and, absent express instructions, never to a widow for
the purpose of posthumous conception. Alain had left no instruc-
tions.234 Corinne and Alain's parents took CECOS to court,
claiming that as Alain's only living heirs they alone had the right
to his sperm.235 CECOS responded, claiming that its only legal
obligation was to Alain, that the deposit had been made solely for
therapeutic purposes, and that sperm is not inheritable and only
devisable when the decedent makes this intention expressly
clear.2
36
230 See Scrivens v. Carrion, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1997, at 31 (noting that the post-
humously born child of a woman not married to the decedent can possibly maintain
an action for wrongful death, as long as the decedent's paternity is proven).
231 See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 11, at 229 n.4 (citing Parpalaix v.
CECOS, Trib. gr. inst. Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gazette du Palais [G.P.], Sept. 15, 1984,
at 11).
232 See id. at 229-30.
2= See id. at 230.
2m4 See id. at 229-31.
235 The Parpalaixs' argued that under French Civil Code Article 1939, the sperm
was a "movable object" which had been placed in a bailment with the sperm bank,
therefore it was inheritable and could be retrieved as long as all of the heirs were in
agreement, which they were. Id. at 230.
236 See id. at 231. CECOS had three contentions: 1) CECOS was liable for the
sperm only to the legal donor and under their normal deposit arrangement, it was
not returnable to heirs; 2) That sperm is innately not inheritable since it is an indi-
visible part of the body, and because Alain had left no express instructions as to the
fate of the sperm, Corinne could not merely claim it; and 3) That the sperm deposit
had been used solely to aid Alain psychologically while he was battling testicular
cancer, and that a birth from sperm obtained for treatment purposes only would be
against public policy. See id.
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The French court acknowledged that, under the current
French Civil Code, any child born to Corinne from Alain's sperm
would not be able to inherit from Alain because a "child born
more than 300 days after the putative father's death is deemed
illegitimate"2 7 and thus, can not inherit through the father.25
The court did not offer a solution to this "unfortunate result," but
instead implied that these laws are outdated and inadequate in
the face of today's myriad of reproductive assistance tech-
niques.239 Like the court in the subsequent Hecht case, the Par-
palaix court determined that sperm is neither simple inheritable
property nor "an indivisible part of the body"24° because of its
unique connection with the fundamental right of procreation.241
Ultimately, the court awarded the sperm to Corinne, not on a
property theory, but on the theory that Alain's unequivocal in-
tention for Corinne to be artificially inseminated with his sperm
was proven by the testimony of his parents and widow.242
The leading United States decision to date in the area of
posthumously conceived children is Hecht v. Kane.24 Prior to his
suicide, William Kane had made several deposits in a Los Ange-
les sperm bank with the apparent knowledge and encouragement
of his girlfriend, Deborah Hecht.24 It was later contended by
William's two grown children that Deborah, with whom William
had been living for the preceding five years, was aware William
was contemplating suicide, and may even have assisted him in
making arrangements.245 Regardless, prior to his death on Octo-
ber 30, 1991, William had executed a will duly recorded and on
file with the Los Angeles County Superior Court, which expressly
237 See id. at 231.
2s See id. at 231-32.
239 See id. at 232, 232 n.22 (quoting the court, "Must we ... under these circum-
stances, revise our traditional ideas of conception?").
240 Id. at 232.
241 See id. The court "described sperm as 'the seed of life.., tied to the funda-
mental liberty of a human being to conceive or not conceive.' " Id. (alteration in
original). The court then refused to apply contract principles because "the fate of the
sperm must be decided by the person from whom it is drawn. Therefore, the sole is-
sue becomes that of intent." Id.
242 See id. at 232-33. Corinne was later inseminated, however, because of the
small amount of sperm and its poor quality, she did not become pregnant. See id. at
233.
243 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993).
m See id. at 276.
2A See id. at 276, 284.
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stated that all rights and title he had in his "sperm stored with
any sperm bank or similar facility" should pass to Deborah. 246
Further, William expressed his intention that Deborah use his
stored sperm, if she desired, to become pregnant.247
William had also included, in the agreement he signed with
the sperm bank, his authorization of the release of his semen
specimens to Deborah.243 Finally, augmenting the proof of his in-
tentions, William wrote a letter to his two living children from a
previous marriage explaining why he killed himself, and ad-
dressed it to his living children and to any children he hoped he
would have with Deborah.249 To the latter he stated, "I have
loved you in my dreams, even though I never got to see you
born."250
William had named Deborah his executrix and had left her
almost his entire estate.251 His two grown children from his prior
marriage contested the will, which left them only a piece of land
in Monterey, California, upon which the house he had left to
Deborah stood.252 Ultimately, Deborah was not made executrix
of William's estate and she entered into a settlement agreement
under which she would instead receive 20% of sums in excess of
$190,000 and some furniture, while each of the children would
receive 40% and share the house.253 After settling, Deborah at-
tempted to retrieve the sperm from the sperm bank, but the ad-
ministrators at the sperm bank would not release it to her.254
Deborah argued that the sperm was not an asset of the estate,
but instead, was a gift to her given in William's lifetime and,
therefore, it was not subject to the settlement agreement. 255 She
claimed that by not releasing the sperm to her, the first settle-
ment agreement had been breached.256 The children protested,
defending the validity of the settlement agreement, but they also
submitted a second settlement agreement declaring that the es-
246 Id. at 276.
247 See id. at 276-77.
m See id. at 276.
249 See id. at 277.
250 Id.
251 See id. at 276-77.
252 See id. at 277.
253 See id.
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tate would assign any interest it may have in the sperm to Debo-
rah if she would indemnify the estate against any future claims
brought by any of William's posthumously conceived children.
Deborah agreed.257
At a hearing on the second settlement agreement, an estate
creditor protested and the children decided not to sign.258 There-
after, the children submitted a petition that the sperm be de-
stroyed or, alternatively, that 100% or at least 80% of the sperm
be given to them.259 Deborah again responded that, because the
sperm was an inter vivos gift, it was not subject to division of the
estate, and even if it was part of the estate, the first settlement
was reached based on the agreement that she would receive all of
the sperm, as the will specifically directed. 260 The trial court or-
dered the sperm destroyed and told Deborah's lawyer 261 that this
case could now go up to the appellate level where it belonged for
the guidance that was desperately needed.262
The court in Hecht addressed several of the policy and con-
stitutional issues in dictum. The decision was limited to finding
a property interest in the sperm sufficient to devise it. The Court
of Appeals analyzed the interest William had in his stored sperm
and determined that he did, in fact, have a limited property in-
terest, similar to the one found in Davis v. Davis for embryos.263
The court distinguished Moore because of the uniqueness of gam-
etes and determined that if it could be shown that William in-
tended to leave the sperm to Deborah, she could be entitled to it
since he had the power to bequeath it.2 64
257 See id.
258 See id.
259 See id. at 278-79.
2W See id. at 279.
261 Ms. Hecht was represented by Marvin L. Rudnick and Michael J. Partos of
Los Angeles and J.R. Nerone of Reseda, California. See id. at 276. It is unclear from
the opinion's quote of the statements taken from the lower court's record which of
these attorneys the comments were addressed to. See id. at 279 n.3.
m See id. at 279-80. Upon being asked by Hecht's attorney "for the legal basis
of the ruling, the court stated, 'It really does not matter, does it? If I am right, I am
right and if I am wrong, I am wrong.... This is something that is going to have to
be decided by the appellate courts. Lets get a decision.' "Id. at 279 n.3.
26 See id. at 282-83.
264 See id. at 283; see also Mika & Hurst, supra note 42, at 1013-14 ("[The
Hecht court held that Kane was entitled to will the sperm to Hecht and, provided she
could establish his intent to do so, the sperm belonged to her.").
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While the appellate court remanded the case for determina-
tion as to the validity of the first settlement agreement, the sec-
ond settlement agreement, and the will as expressive of William's
intent, the court found there was a sufficient property interest in
the sperm to make it part of the estate, and thereby validated the
probate court's jurisdiction.265 The court did not pass on whether
a property interest in sperm was valid as applied to an inter vivos
gift,266 and denied Deborah's writ that the sperm be released to
her, pending a decision on the decedent's intent.267 The court
reminded the decedent's children that if the first agreement was
valid, as they claimed, Deborah would be entitled to 20% of the
sperm.268 The court also dismissed the children's argument that
Deborah should be denied the sperm on the basis of policy rea-
sons against the artificial insemination of unmarried women,
pointing out there is no pertinent authority in California de-
nouncing the practice, and in fact, the court cited many cases
permitting it.269 Finally, the court rejected the children's argu-
ment that post-mortem artificial insemination should be void as
against public policy because of a lack of authority to support the
proposition and a reticence to restrict the decisional authority of
gamete providers. 270
The Hecht court suggested, in dictum, as did the French
court in Parpalaix, that under the local probate code, a posthu-
mously conceived child would likely not be able to inherit from a
deceased parent.271 Further, both the Parpalaix court and the
Hecht court agreed that posthumously conceived children are not
2 See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283, 289 n.9.
266 See id. at 283 (declining to extend the holding of this case to gift or personal
property law, or causa mortis gifts).
267 See id. at 284.
268 See id.
269 See id. at 287. The court refused to accept the children's arguments that ei-
ther California case law or state adoption statutes supports the proposition that
unmarried women should not be artificially inseminated. See id. at 286-87. The
court also noted that "New York's high court also recently rejected the argument
that the state has a sufficiently strong interest in providing two-parent families to
discriminate against unwed fathers." Id. at 286.
270 See id. at 288-91. "'It is not the role of the judiciary to inhibit the use of re-
productive technology when the Legislature has not seen fit to do so; any such effort
would raise serious questions in light of the fundamental nature of the rights of pro-
creation and privacy.' "Id. at 290-91 (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.
1990)).
271 See id. at 290.
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per se against public policy. 272 The decedent's grown children in
Hecht made the argument that posthumously conceived children
are against public policy and destructive to family integrity, and
therefore, should not be sanctioned by law.2 7 3 The judge dis-
agreed, citing the total lack of authority to support this proposi-
tion and relying extensively on the court's reasoning in Davis to
uphold reproductive autonomy.27 4 The court also pointed to a
California Supreme Court case which stated that restrictions on
the uses of reproductive technology are solely a decision for the
legislature because of the significant impact on such "fundamen-
tal... rights of procreation and privacy."275
A relatively recent British Court of Appeals' decision ad-
dressed the issue of whether a woman should be given sperm
taken from her dying husband to conceive their child posthu-
mously.276 Stephen Blood was suffering from meningitis and had
reportedly discussed the idea of posthumous conception with his
wife and instructed her that he wanted her to have his child
posthumously if he died.277 It appears uncontroverted that Ste-
phen did not leave any written record of this intention because
his worsening condition and his ultimate death came on rapidly
and somewhat unexpectedly. 278 While unconscious in the hospi-
tal, the physicians used an "electro-ejaculation" procedure to
cause Stephen's sperm to travel into his bladder; they then ex-
272 See id. at 288-89; Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 11, at 231-33.
273 See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287, 288-89.
274 See id.
275 Id. at 291 (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993)).
276 See Ex parte Blood, 2 W.L.R. 806 (CA. 1997). This case has prompted discus-
sion in the British press as to the moral and ethical implications of allowing such a
practice. See Melanie Phillips, In the Brave New World of Embryo High Technology,
the Father Need Play No Role Other Than As a Gamete in a Test Tube, OBSERVER,
Jan. 26, 1997, at 2, available in 1997 WL 7809606 (arguing that not only is the prac-
tice of posthumous conception generally offensive, but that it is completely inappro-
priate under the circumstances of this case); Diane Blood, Matters of Fact That Re-
spect the Wishes of My Late Husband, OBSERVER, Feb. 2, 1997, at 27, available in
1997 WL 7809901 (responding to Ms. Phillip's criticisms and defending her position
by clarifying the facts of the case).
277 See Ex parte Blood, 3 W.L.R. 1176, 1181-82 (Q.B. 1996); Phillips, supra note
278, at 2.
278 See Blood, 3 W.L.R. at 1178 (chronicling the sudden onset of meningitis
symptoms and Stephan's being certified as clinically dead four days later); Phillips,
supra note 276, at 2 ("[Mr. Blood] had not provided [written consent] not surpris-
ingly, since he had had no reason to imagine that he was going to die prematurely.").
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tracted the sperm using a catheter and separated it from the
urine.279
The Blood case illustrates how determining the intent of the
decedent is the central focus of many of these cases. Intent on
the part of the decedent must be shown. In this case, the combi-
nation of an absence of any written confirmation combined with
the unusual way in which the sperm was collected raised suffi-
cient doubt as to Stephen's intent, such that the Human Fertili-
sation and Embryology Authority refused to allow Mrs. Blood to
be inseminated.280 The Court of Appeals confirmed that under
British law written consent is required for the collection of sperm
and the only possible exception is when the sperm is used imme-
diately, i.e., not preserved.28l
1. Analogous Decisions: Artificial Insemination and In Vitro
Fertilization
It is well established that whenever the law is faced with a
novel area, as reproductive technology and posthumously con-
ceived children certainly are, developed bodies of law are looked
to for guidance and analogies are drawn. In the case of posthu-
mously conceived children, the courts often look to the related
areas of artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization. For ex-
ample, when Judge Lillie in Hecht was faced with the first in-
stance in the United States of a woman claiming the right to use
her deceased lover's sperm to have his child posthumously,
analogies were drawn, principally to developed case law on artifi-
cial insemination.282
279 See Blood, 2 W.L.R. at 809; Blood, supra note 276, at 27 (explaining that the
procedure was completely painless for her comatose husband); Phillips, supra note
276, at 2 (describing graphically the procedure of electro-ejaculation); see also Shah,
supra note 20, at 547 (recounting the 1994 request by Anthony Biaz's widow to the
medical examiner to try to save her husband's sperm so that she could attempt to
become pregnant).
280 See Blood, 2 W.L.R. at 806 (citing the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority's denial to allow Mrs. Blood to either use her husband's sperm to conceive
his child in Britain or to take the specimens abroad to have the procedure done).
281 See id. at 806-07.
22 See Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281-82, 284-87 (Ct. App. 1993) (re-
lying on Jhordan C. v. Mary L, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986) and mentioning
Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992) (in banc); People v. Sorensen, 437
P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968) (in banc); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977)).
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Historically, children born out-of-wedlock or conceived with
one other than a spouse were illegitimate and legally "father-
less," and thus unable to inherit and without support rights.
When artificial insemination became more common, courts de-
ciding the fate of artificially-conceived children often deemed
them "illegitimate" and denied any support or inheritance rights.
In one of the earliest United States cases on the status of a child
born of artificial insemination, Strnad v. Strnad,283 a New York
court found that a child conceived by artificial insemination us-
ing donor sperm is similar to an adopted child, and, as such, the
father would be considered at least a foster parent, if not a natu-
ral parent, with similar rights and obligations.284 The court did
not broach the possibility that the child may be considered the
actual legal offspring of the consenting father nor did it discuss
any inheritance rights, but instead reasoned that since Mr.
Strnad possessed at least the rights of a foster parent he should
be allowed weekly visitation with the child2 5
In a later New York case, Gursky v. Gursky,2 6 the court dis-
tinguished Strnad as dealing only with visitation rights and dis-
missed any statements in Strnad that could be construed as as-
serting that children of artificial insemination are legitimate.28 7
The court ultimately found that Mr. Gursky did have an obliga-
tion to support the child based on contract estoppel theory.2M
The decision expressly stated that artificial insemination using
sperm other than the husband's "with or without the consent of
the husband, constitutes adultery on the part of the mother, and
that a child so conceived is... illegitimate."289 The Gursky court
cited the Illinois case of Doornbos v. Doornbos290 as persuasive.29'
In Doornbos, Illinois adopted the Canadian reasoning of the time,
that children of an Artificial Insemination Donor (AID) cannot be
legitimate because it is the conception of a child with one other
2m 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
See id. at 391-92.
2 See id. The court also noted that it was not passing judgment on the correct-
ness of artificially-assisted procreation, leaving that discussion to the realms of"so-
ciology, morality and religion." Id. at 392.
2w 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
287 See id. at 410-11.
28s See id. at 411-12.
2 9 Id. at 411.
290 139 N.E.2d 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956).
291 See Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
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than a legal spouse that adultery laws aim to discourage, not the
act of extramarital sexual intercourse. 292
This perspective on artificial insemination was entirely re-
jected by the California Supreme Court in People v. Sorensen.293
The court announced that when a husband consents to and/or
participates in the physician-assisted AID of his wife, where the
donor is completely anonymous, he cannot later renege on his re-
sponsibilities to that child.294 The court pointed out that without
the active participation of the husband, the child would not ex-
ist.295 In dictum, the court conceded that whether these children
will be considered "legitimate" or "illegitimate" was a decision for
the legislature, but it criticized arguments that labeled these
children illegitimate and explained the policy reasons that com-
pelled legitimacy.296
Many cases have since clarified and expanded on the Soren-
son decision and subsequent artificial insemination-related stat-
utes, many of which will find a woman's husband the father of an
AID baby when the husband gives written consent. In In re Baby
Doe,297 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that "a husband
who consents for his wife to conceive a child through artificial in-
semination, with the understanding that the child will be treated
as their own, is the legal father of the child... and will be
charged with all the legal responsibilities of paternity, including
support."298 The court resolved that although many state stat-
utes require the husband's written consent to declare him the le-
gal father, equity demands that he be held responsible for sup-
port when his consent can be implied.299
292 See Doornbos, 139 N.E.2d 844.
293 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968) (in banc).
294 See id. at 498. The California Supreme Court left no room for doubt, "[t]he
law is that defendant is the lawful father of the child born to his wife, which child
was conceived by artificial insemination to which he consented, and his conduct car-
ries with it an obligation of support within the meaning of ... the Penal Code." Id.
295 See id. at 499.
296 See id. at 501-02. The court also discussed the related arguments for catego-
rizing artificial insemination as adultery, and pointed out the "patently absurd" re-
sults this could effect, for example, the procedure may be performed by a female doc-
tor or the sperm could be injected by the woman's own husband. See id. at 501.
297 353 S.E.2d 877 (S.C. 1987).
298 Id. at 878.
299 See id. at 878-79. "Husband's consent to his wife's impregnation by artificial
insemination may be express, or it may be implied from conduct which evidences
knowledge of the procedure and failure to object." Id. at 879.
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In In re Marriage of Adams,300 the Supreme Court of Illinois
applied Florida law in determining whether the husband had an
obligation to support a child of AID because the insemination had
been performed in Florida and the parties were living there at
the time.30' The court noted, in dictum, that Florida's broader
statute provided the child with a greater opportunity to obtain
support, and that it did not want to hamper that possibility by
adjudicating the case under the more restrictive Illinois stat-
ute.3 02 The court also observed that even under Illinois' statute
(based on the Uniform Parentage Act), which required written
consent of the husband, there was a possibility that absent such
a writing, contract estoppel theory could still mandate child sup-
port.303
Since the 1970s, courts have faced countless and increasingly
unfamiliar scenarios arising from artificial insemination-such
as they are now beginning to face with posthumously conceived
children. In C.M. v. C.C.,304 C.C. testified that she told C.M.,
whom she had been dating, that she wanted to have a child by
artificial insemination and asked C.M. to provide the sperm.305
C.M. agreed to do so, although C.C. refused to have sexual inter-
course before they were married.306 The artificial insemination
was performed by C.C. at home without a physician.30 7  C.M.
claimed that he was under the impression he would be the baby's
recognized father but C.C. vehemently objected.308 C.M. sued for
and won visitation rights with the baby.30 9 The court opined that
"natural father[s] [are] entitled to visitation rights with...
[their] illegitimate children."310 Because C.M. was the baby's
admitted natural father and not an anonymous donor, he was
granted visitation privileges despite the artificial method of con-
300 551 N.E.2d 635 (Ill. 1990).
301 See id. at 639.
302 See id.
303 See id. at 637, 638. "It may be the case that a support obligation will be found
even in the absence of a parent-child relationship." Id. at 638.
304 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977).
305 See id.
306 See id.
307 See id. at 821-22.
308 See id. at 822.
309 See id. at 825.
310 Id. at 822.
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ception.3 11 The court cited policy reasons for its decision, princi-
pally, that a child have a father.312 Further, the court distin-
guished between an AID situation where the mother is married,
and one in which the woman will be a single parent, because in
the former, the woman's husband is the child's legally recognized
father.313
The court in Jhordan C. v. Mary K 314 took this analysis a
step further, holding that under the Uniform Parentage Act,315 as
enacted by state law, a mother could negate any claim of paren-
tal rights by the sperm donor through even limited involvement
of a physician in the procedure, whether or not the donor was
known to the mother.3 16 In this case, Mary and her partner Vic-
toria had agreed that Mary would have a child through artificial
insemination whom they would raise jointly.317 Jhordan, an ac-
quaintance, agreed to provide the sperm and the insemination
was performed at home by either Mary alone or Mary and Victo-
ria.3 18 Jhordan was listed as the father on the birth certificate
and after the child's birth he made clear his intention to behave
as the baby's father and Mary protested.319 Jhordan later sued
for and won visitation rights.320 He was also required, however,
to reimburse the county for public assistance paid for the baby
and to commence child support payments.321 The court found
that the main requirement for a mother to claim protection under
the California statute against unwanted intrusions by sperm do-
nors, was that the sperm be "'provided to a licensed physician.' "322
Therefore, the court reasoned, had Jhordan given the sperm to a
licensed physician, regardless of the fact that the procedure was
311 See id. at 824-25.
312 See id. at 824.
313 See id. at 823-24.
314 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
315 For a detailed discussion of the UPA, see infra Part III § B.
316 See Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
317 See id. at 532.
318 See id.
319 See id. at 532-33.
320 See id. at 533, 538.
321 See id. at 533.
322 See id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1975), amended by § 7613
(1994)).
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performed at home and that Mary knew the donor's identity, she
could have prevented Jhordan from asserting parental rights.32
In Nancy S. v. Michele G.,324 Nancy sought a declaratory
judgment that Michele, her lesbian partner, was not a parent to
her two children born of AID.325 The court agreed, finding that
Michele was not a "parent" within the meaning of the Uniform
Parentage Act ("UPA), which includes a presumption that a
mother's "husband" is a parent.326 In addition, the court found
that Michele was neither a de facto parent, which has a very
limited scope and is usually reserved for situations where the
natural parent is unfit, nor did she stand in loco parentis.327 The
court asserted that any extension of the classification "parent" is
a legislative decision.382
In Karin T. v. Michael T.,329 Karin sued for support of her
two children born of AID while she was "married" to Michael.330
Michael, it turns out, had been born Marlene and had been living
as a man for many years. At the time of trial, his actual sex was
unknown. 331 The court, after sharing its surprise at being given
the positive defense of womanhood in a paternity case for child
support, cited the contract estoppel reasoning of Gursky, as well
as public policy, in support of its holding that Michael was liable
for child support.332
Today, children born of artificial insemination are almost
always determined to be the legal child of the married couple, re-
323 See id. at 534.
324 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991).
32 See id. at 214.
326 See id. at 214, 215 n.3.
327 See id. at 216-17.
328 See id. at 219 ("[Gliven the 'complex practical, social and constitutional rami-
fications' of expanding the class of persons entitled to assert parental rights, the de-
cision [is] better left to the Legislature.") (quoting In re Marriage of Lewis & Goetz,
250 Cal. Rptr. 30 (Ct. App. 1988)).
32 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Faim. Ct. 1985).
330 See id. at 781.
331 See id. at 781-82. The court noted that regardless of whether or not Michael
was indeed a transsexual, for purposes of this action the court found him to be fe-
male. See id. at 782.
332 See id. at 781 ("To this rather routine-appearing Petition, the respondent has
filed an Answer which sets forth as an affirmative defense .... ' That respondent is a
female .... ' ").
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gardless of the sperm's origin.333 This conclusion is usually based
on either state statutes (some modeled after the Uniform Parent-
age Act) or on an estoppel theory of contract, where the hus-
band's consent forms the basis of the contract.334 The majority of
parentage questions that continue to arise with respect to chil-
dren of artificial insemination involve single mothers, lesbians,
and, most recently, widows or lovers of deceased sperm donors.335
Artificial insemination is not only the oldest and most com-
mon form of current reproductive assistance, but it is a procedure
that is likely to be used in combination with cryopreservation to
produce posthumously conceived children. Therefore, these deci-
sions, and their underlying rationales, are persuasive when fac-
ing similar questions in relation to posthumously conceived chil-
dren. The courts, through recent case law, clearly have declined
to extend the definition of "parent" and generally reserve this
right for the legislature. Therefore, if posthumously conceived
children are to be deemed "children" of the deceased "parent,"
this decision will almost certainly have to come from the state
legislatures.
Whereas artificial insemination is the preeminent process by
which a deceased man can parent posthumously conceived chil-
dren,336 in vitro fertilization can be used by either a man (with
the assistance of a surrogate) or a woman for post-mortem par-
enthood. If embryos are cryogenically preserved, a woman may,
after the death of her partner, attempt to become pregnant
through in vitro fertilization. A man, on the other hand, can se-
cure a surrogate to undergo in vitro fertilization of a frozen em-
33 See SCOTT, supra note 5, at 205 (applauding the United States for the UPA
and acknowledging that in most nations in the world, there is still a serious legal
question as to whether a consenting husband will be deemed the "father" of a child of
AID).
334 See In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (UPA); In re Marriage of
Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635 (111. 1990) (both); Estate of Gordon, 501 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sur.
Ct. 1986) (UPA); Karin T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (estoppel); In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d
877 (S.C. 1987) (estoppel).
33 See Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993) (deceased boyfriend);
Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991) (lesbians); Jhordan C. v.
Mary L, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986) (unmarried, lesbian mother); C.M. v.
C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977) (unmarried mother); Karin T., 484
N.Y.S.2d 780 (transsexual); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)
(unmarried mother); Exparte Blood, 2 W.L.R. 806 (C.A. 1997) (deceased husband).
336 See GILLIAN DOUGLAS, LAW, FERTILITY AND REPRODUCTION 108-10 (1991).
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bryo that was created from his and his deceased partner's gam-
etes. Therefore, the developing case law surrounding in vitro fer-
tilization, and surrogacy in particular, is instructive on the issues
and potential solutions associated with posthumous conception.
When an embryo is created during an in vitro fertilization
procedure from the sperm and egg of a husband and wife, there
can be little question as to who the genetic parents are.3 3 7 If a
surrogate mother is used, however, the issue becomes who is the
"natural" or "legal" mother.338 In Anna J. v. Mark C.,339 the sur-
rogate mother threatened to keep the unborn child and the ge-
netic parents sued for custody.34° The court found that, while
giving birth to a child is one way for the natural mother to estab-
lish herself as the legal mother under the UPA, a surrogate with
no genetic ties to the child cannot be the natural mother, even if
she gives birth.341 This reasoning seems to suggest that, if an
embryo were implanted in a surrogate after the death of the ge-
netic mother, that surrogate would be unable to assert any pa-
rental rights over the resulting child. Thus, the child would
solely belong to the sperm provider. The result may be different,
however, if neither parent is alive at the time of the child's birth.
For example, a California couple, who died in a plane crash, left
337 See Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375-76 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting
that blood tests are not infallible but explaining that the in this case the results con-
clusively showed the surrogate was not the mother and she offered no evidence to
show the tests were faulty).
= Justice Sills lamented in Anna J., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 371, that the modem le-
gal system does not allow judges to use King Solomon's technique to determine who
has more concern for the child:
[Aind the King said, bring me a sword, and they brought a sword before the
King.
And the King said, divide the living child in two, and give half to one and
half to the other. Then spake the woman whose the living child was unto
the King... , and she said, 0 my Lord, give her the living child, and in no
wise slay it. But the other said, Let it be neither mine nor thine, but divide
it.
Then the King answered and said, Give her the living child, and in no wise
slay it: she is the mother thereof.
1 Kings 3:16, 27.
339 286 Cal. Rptr. 369.
34 See id. at 372-73. In a letter that "Anna," the surrogate sent to the genetic
parents, she told them, "[Tihis situation can go two ways. One, you can pay me the
entire sum early..., or two you can forget about helping me but, calling it a breach
of contract and notget the baby!" Id. at 372 n.11.
341 See id. at 377.
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two frozen embryos in Australia at the time of their death.3 42 At
least thirty couples expressed interest in the embryos as a result
of the widespread publicity the event generated.3 43 If the em-
bryos had been carried to term, would the resulting children have
inherited from their wealthy gamete providers, who had only one
other heir?344
Cases such as Anna J. v. Mark C.345 and the turmoil an un-
successful surrogate motherhood agreement produces have in-
spired legal scholars8 46 and motivated lawmakers.3 47 In fact, the
bulk of the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception
Act ("USCACA") of 1988 deals with the formation and enforce-
ment of surrogacy contracts. 348 While undoubtedly legislation is
needed, the USCACA does not provide sufficient guidance on
post-mortem situations, including surrogacy, and what structure
the Act does include is likely too restrictive to be upheld as con-
342 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 86; Joseph J. Saltarelli, Note, Genesis
Retold: Legal Issues Raised by the Cryopreservation of Preimplantation Human Em-
bryos, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1021, 1030 (1985) (citing Otten, Fertility Rights: Medical
Efforts to Help Childless Couples Pose Host of Difficult Issues, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7,
1984, at 1, col. 6).
343 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 87 (noting that couples from various
countries volunteered to carry the embryos); Saltarelli, supra note 342, at 1033.
3" See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 4, at 86-87 (recounting the controversy that
arose surrounding the status and fate of these embryos and the argument made by
Professor John Noonan from the University of California that under California law
the embryos had rights in the decedents' estate).
345 See, e.g., In re Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987) (upholding the
surrogacy contract and thereby granting custody to the sperm donor and his wife
and terminating the surrogate mother's parental rights), aft'd in part, rev'd in part
537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (holding the surrogacy contract unenforceable because it
was equivalent to baby selling, awarding the surrogate mother visitation privileges,
while leaving custody with the adoptive parents).
34 See, e.g., LORI ANDREWS, BETWEEN STRANGERS: SURROGATE MOTHERS,
EXPECTANT FATHERS, & BRAVE NEW BABIES (1989); MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES (1988); PRETORIUS, supra note 66.
347 See Garcia, supra note 86, at 213; see, e.g., UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF
ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9B U.L.A. 184 (Supp. 1998); SURROGATE PARENTING,
supra note 27, at 19 (1988).
348 See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT §§ 5 (Surro-
gacy Agreement), 6 (Petition and Hearing for Approval of Surrogacy Agreement), 7
(Termination of Surrogacy Agreement), 8 (Parentage Under Approved Surrogacy
Agreement), 9 (Surrogacy: Miscellaneous Provisions), 9B U.L.A. 184; c.f id. at 185
(Prefatory Note) ("This Act has made only limited tangential use of so-called surro-
gacy components and then only to augment and clarify the rights of children born
under the new technology as well as the rights of the parties to these arrange-
ments.").
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stitutional. It appears conclusive, however, that according to the
USCACA and common law, privileges do not attach to a surro-
gate mother solely because she carried the baby when she is not
a gamete provider.
B. The Uniform Acts
In 1973, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws promulgated the Uniform Parentage Act
("UPA) as a guide for the courts in determining the status of
children born outside of traditional boundaries. 349 As of 1998,
eighteen states have adopted this Act.350 The UPA addresses is-
sues raised by parenthood in general and, specifically, in regard
to artificial insemination, the legal status of sperm donors and
the husband of the woman who has undergone AID.351 Section 5
of the UPA, titled Artificial Insemination, has been adopted in a
number of states and provides in pertinent part:
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and
with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated ar-
tificially with semen donated by a man not her husband,
the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural fa-
ther of a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent
must be in writing and signed by him and his wife. The
physician shall certify their signatures and the date of the
349 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287, 289 (1987) (ac-
knowledging that the Act's main focus was to establish "substantive legal equality
for all children regardless of the marital status of their parents"); Anna J. v. Mark
C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing the guidance provided by the UPA
as assisting them to reach a decision); Jhordan C. v. Mary K, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530,
533 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the California statute was adopted almost verbatim
from the UPA).
350 See ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-1 to 26-17-22 (Supp. 1998); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600
to 7730 (Deering 1996); COL. REV. STAT. §§ 19-4-101 to 19-4-130 (1998); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13 §§ 801 to 819 (Supp. 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 584-1 to 584-26
(Michie 1997); 750 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 45/1 to 45/6 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 38-1110 to 38-1138 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51 to 257.75 (West 1998);
M O. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.817 to 210.852 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§40-6-101 to
40-6-135 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§126.011 to 126.371 (Michie 1998); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-38 to 9:17-59 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11-1 to 40-11-23
(Michie 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-01 to 14-17-26 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 3111.01 to 3111.19 (Anderson 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-8-1 to 15-8-27
(1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.010 to 26.26.905 (West 1997); WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-120 (Michie 1999).
351 See UNWF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301.
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insemination, and file the husband's consent with the
[State Department of Health], where it shall be kept con-
fidential and in a sealed file. However, the physician's
failure to do so does not affect the father and child rela-
tionship.352
The Prefatory Note to the UPA cross-references the Uniform
Act on Paternity ("UAP"), which states in pertinent part, "[t]he
father of a child which is or may be born out of wedlock is liable
to the same extent as the father of a child born in wedlock... for
the ... necessary support.. . of the child;"353 and "[i]f paternity
has been determined [or has been acknowledged according to the
laws of this state], the liabilities of the father may be enforced...
by the mother, child, or... public authority ... and ... by other
persons including private agencies."354 Generally, the determina-
tion of paternity has not yet been addressed in other state stat-
utes. Section 7, however, provides, "[t]he court... may... or-
der.., blood tests. If any party refuses... the court may resolve
the question of paternity against such party or enforce its order if
the rights of others and the interests of justice so require."355
Section 11 of the UPA re-enforces section 7 of the UAP regarding
when blood tests will be ordered, and section 12 of the UPA gives
examples of evidence that may be used in determining pater-
nity.3 56 While the question of paternity of a posthumously con-
352 Id. (alteration in original).
353 UNIF. ACT ON PATERNITY § 1, 9B U.L.A. 350 (1987); see UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 287.
354 UNIF. ACT ON PATERNITY § 2, 9B U.L.A. 352 (second alteration in original).
355 Id. at § 7. The Comment to § 7 states that this section, and two others, are
from the UNIF. ACT ON BLOOD TESTS TO DETERMINE PATERNITY.
356 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 11, 9B U.L.A. 316; id. at § 12, providing:
Evidence relating to paternity may include:
(1)evidence of sexual intercourse between the mother and alleged father at
any possible time of conception;
(2)an expert's opinion concerning the statistical probability of the alleged
father's paternity based upon the duration of the mother's pregnancy;
(3)blood test results, weighted in accordance with evidence, if available, of
the statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity;
(4)medical or anthropological evidence relating to the alleged father's pa-
ternity of the child based on tests performed by experts. If a man has been
identified as a possible father of the child, the court may, and upon request
of a party shall, require the child, the mother, and the man to submit to
appropriate tests; and
(5)all other evidence relevant to the issue of paternity of the child.
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ceived child has not yet been raised in court, as these sections of
the UAP and UPA demonstrate, it is well within a court's juris-
diction to order any testing necessary to conclusively determine
that a child is the posthumously conceived child of the decedent.
Finally, section 4 of the UAP, titled Limitations on Recovery from
Father's Estate, provides "[t]he obligation of the estate of the fa-
ther for liabilities under this Act is limited to amounts accrued
prior to his death [and such sums as may be payable for depend-
ence under other lawsl."3 57 This seems to imply that if a posthu-
mously conceived child was found to be within the class called
"children," that child may be eligible to inherit from the deceased
"parent" under other support and probate laws.
The Restatement Second of Property section 25.2 supports
the presumption that a child whose paternity can be proven may
be included in the category "children" for inheritance purposes,
regardless of whether the child was born out of wedlock.3 58 The
Restatement also declares that children "conceived by means
other than sexual intercourse" are "children" for inheritance pur-
poses, as long as the child is recognized as such by the dece-
dent.3 59 In fact, the Restatement Second specifies in a comment
to section 25.3 that a child of in vitro fertilization will be pre-
sumed to be included within the primary meaning of "children"
and will inherit as such.360 Thus, an interpretation of the Uni-
357 UNIF. ACT ON PATERNITY § 4, 9B U.LA. 356 (second alteration in original).
358 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 25.2 (1988). This section, titled
Gifts to "Children"--Children Born Out of Wedlock, provides:
When the donor of property describes the beneficiaries thereof as the "chil-
dren" of a designated person, the primary meaning of such class gift term
includes a descendant in the first generation of such person who is born out
of wedlock. It is assumed, in the absence of language or circumstances indi-
cating a contrary intent, that the donor adopts such primary meaning.
Id.
359 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 25.3 (1988). This section, titled
Gifts to "Children--Child Conceived by Means Other Than Sexual Intercourse, pro-
vides:
When the donor of property describes the beneficiaries thereof as "children"
of a designated person, the primary meaning of such class gift term in-
cludes a child conceived by means other than sexual intercourse who is rec-
ognized by the designated person as his or her child. It is assumed, in the
absence of language or circumstances indicating a contrary intent, that the
donor adopts such primary meaning.
Id.
360 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 25.3 cmt. e (1988). This com-
ment to § 25.3, titled, In vitro fertilization and the surrogate mother, provides:
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form statutes in conjunction with the Restatement Second would
suggest that if the paternity of the decedent is proven, the post-
humously conceived child can, theoretically, inherit as a member
of the class of "children."
Over time, the UPA's use of the term "husband" provoked
questions as to whether the same presumption of paternity would
apply to a long-term partner.361 In addition, litigation began to
center on what was meant by specific provisions in the UPA (e.g.,
"under the supervision of a licensed physician," "wife" and "hus-
band," and "husband's consent must be in writing"), what would
give rise to the presumption, and further, what was sufficient to
rebut that presumption.3 62 Unfortunately, the guidelines pro-
vided by the UPA were also somewhat limited. For example, the
Act referred only to children conceived through artificial insemi-
nation,363 thereby neglecting to indicate the status of parties in-
volved in in vitro fertilization, GIFT, and other procedures, and
how cryopreservation or posthumous conception would compli-
cate the outcome.364
If the semen of a man is used to fertilize the egg of a woman outside the
uterus with their mutual consent, and the fertilized egg is implanted in the
woman who furnished the egg or in a surrogate mother who is to carry the
child, it is reasonable to conclude that the child thus produced for the man
and woman involved is to be recognized by them as their child. It is reason-
able to conclude the donor would intend such child to be included in the
primary meaning of a gift to the "children" of either one. In the absence of
further evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the donor of a gift to a
surrogate mother's "children" would not intend to include in the primary
meaning of the class gift term the child carried by the surrogate mother.
Id.
361 See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that lesbian partner is not a "husband" under the UPA); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224
Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986) (same).
362 See, e.g., Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (holding that "provided to licensed
physician" was requisite under the statute to eliminate the sperm donor's parental
rights); In re Marriage of Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ill. 1990) (asserting that
"husband's consent 'must be in writing' "was essential for the presumption of pater-
nity to hold).
363 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 357 (1987). This section, titled, Ar-
tificial Insemination, is the only section of the Act that directly discusses the status
of children born through assisted reproductive technology and it refers only to artifi-
cial insemination. See id.
364 In fact, the Comment section following § 5 acknowledges that this section is
not even conclusive on all of the possible legal issues that artificial insemination, it-
self, may raise. See id. at 302.
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In 1988, the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Concep-
tion Act ("USCACA") was introduced to remedy the perceived de-
ficiencies of the UPA. As of 1998, only two states have adopted
it.365 The USCACA provides unambiguous definitions and rules
which apply to all presently available methods of reproductive
technology used to aid conception.366  The majority of the
USCACA provisions are aimed at resolving issues that arise in
surrogacy situations. 67 Section 4, however, entitled Parental
Status of Donors and Deceased Individuals, denies the legitimacy
of posthumously conceived children in one fell swoop.
According to USCACA section 4, "[aln individual who dies
before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is conceived
other than through sexual intercourse, using the individual's egg
or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child."368 This elimi-
nates any question as to whether a posthumously conceived child
may inherit or receive benefits from the deceased parent. It is as
if that parent never existed for that child, i.e., that the child falls
under the old common law heading of "illegitimate." On the
other hand, the text of the Act itself does not address a decedent's
making of express provisions for posthumous children.3 69 There-
fore, in cases like Hecht v. Kane, where William expressly de-
noted his intent that Deborah conceive his child posthumously,
William presumably could make provisions for such child.
365 See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-
156 to 20-165 (Michie 1995).
366 See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT Prefatory
Note, 9B U.LA. 184 (1997). The Prefatory note asserts, "This Act was designed pri-
marily to effect the security and well being of those children born and living in our
midst as a result of assisted conception." Id. at 185 (emphasis added). It further ex-
plains:
The narrowness of the Act is designed to limit its applicability to what is
best for children. The design of the limitation was also intended to
strengthen the focus of this Act in the eyes of legislators and the public as
prospective legislation which is needed immediately to provide order, direc-
tion, and design with dignity to the unsettled lives of our target children.
Id.
36 See infra note 380; see also UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED
CONCEPTION ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 184,185 (1997).
36s UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4, 9B U.LA.
189; see also WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 55, 57 (using "in utero" as the defining
time for inheritance purposes).
369 In fact, the Comment to section 4 specifically states, "Of course, those who
want to explicitly provide for such children in their wills may do so." UNIF. STATUS
OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, § 4 comment, at 190.
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Whether a testamentary gift to a posthumous child would be ac-
ceptable under the probate laws, however, remains unanswered.
The USCACA does not attempt to prevent posthumously
conceived children on policy grounds or otherwise,370 but in at-
tempting to draw some clear lines, it seems to have swung too far
in the restrictive direction.371 The blanket statement that post-
humously conceived children are not the legal children of the de-
ceased parent could circumvent the implied, and on occasion the
express, wishes of the decedent. It seems likely that these cases
will usually involve a grieving spouse who had been trying to
conquer infertility with his or her partner in life and whose last
chance to parent a child with the decedent is artificial concep-
tion-not an opportunist trying to garner more of the estate
through shady practices. Although insincerity, undue influence,
and selfishness have been asserted in some of the existing
cases, 372 this could be handled on a case-by-case basis in the
analysis of "intent." Therefore, flatly denying the right of post-
humously conceived children to be considered the children of the
deceased parent seems premature. It appears that the USCACA
merely perpetuates laws similar to the French laws denounced as
outdated by the Parpalaix court almost 15 years ago.
C. Probate Issues
Probate issues are intimately linked with the fate of post-
humously conceived children. Whether the question is a living
person's right to be granted possession to use a decedent's gam-
etes or frozen embryos, or whether it is a posthumously conceived
child's legal status for inheritance and benefits purposes, it will
usually arise in conjunction with the probating of the decedent's
estate.
Under common law, a child born after the writing of a will,
even posthumously, could cause the will to be revoked, if no other
provision had been made for that child, thus protecting the inter-
370 See id.
371 See Mika & Hurst, supra note 42, at 1017 (illuminating the disadvantages of
the USCACA).
372 See, e.g., Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993); Ex Parte Blood,
2 W.L.R. 806 (C.A. 1997) (addressing claims that the living partner unduly influ-
enced or manipulated the decedent, thereby clouding his true intent).
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ests of these children.373 Currently, however, most states have
afterborn child and pretermitted heir statutes.37 4 The common
law and these modern statutes, however, do not address a situa-
tion where the child is conceived after death.3 75
If a posthumously conceived child is not recognized as the
"child" of a decedent, then he or she will not be able to inherit in-
testate from the deceased parent. Historically, an illegitimate
child could not take in intestacy from a deceased parent and was
not included in a testamentary gift, unless the decedent had
made an express bequest or had unequivocally implied that a gift
to "children" included illegitimate children also.3 76 Later this
"necessary implication" doctrine was expanded to include any in-
dication of the decedent's intent to include illegitimate chil-
dren.3 77 Today, most modern state probate codes, and the Uni-
form Probate Code, allow illegitimate children to inherit as
373 See 79 AM. JURl Wills § 632 (1975) stating-
The common-law rule... is that the marriage of a man and the birth to the
union thus consummated of a child capable of inheriting from him, both
events occurring subsequently to the execution of his will, revoke the will
so as to permit the after-born child to take his share as an heir of the testa-
tor, in the absence of a provision for the benefit of the child.... The birth of
a posthumous child is within the rule.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
374 See MELVIN MADISON BIGELOW, THE LAW OF WILLS 115-16 (1996); see also
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302, 8 U.LA 322 (1983) (Pretermitted Children) (provid-
ing that a child born or adopted after the execution of a will is entitled to that por-
tion he or she would have received if the testator had died intestate, subject to lim-
ited exceptions).
375 See BIGELOW, supra note 374, at 171 ("['Children' means] legitimate offspring
in the first generation, including those en ventre sa mere.") (emphasis added); see
also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108, 8 U.L.A. 87 (1983) ("An individual in gestation at
a particular time is treated as living at the time if the individual lives 120 hours or
more after birth."); Unif. Act on Intestacy, Wills, and Donative TRANSFERS § 108, 8B
U.L.A. 24 (1993) (Afterborn Heirs) (same); cf. BIGELOW, supra note 374, at 296-98
(explaining that certain gifts to children "to be born" are acceptable as long the gift
is immediate).
376 See BIGELOW, supra note 374, at 200-01 (noting the common law presump-
tion that illegitimate children were excluded and explaining the "necessary implica-
tion" doctrine that required that a decedent make a necessary implication for ille-
gitimate children to inherit as part of the class "children"); LAWRENCE W.
WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 133 (1991) ("Historically, the common law labeled
nonmarital children as Tfilius nulluis'-the child of no one. These children formally
lacked the right to inherit from or through either parent.").
377 See BIGELOW, supra note 374, at 202 ("Any reasonable evidence that the tes-
tator meant [to include] illegitimate children would now be considered.").
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"children," as long as paternity is proven.378 Under these modern
statutes, as long as the paternity of a posthumously conceived
child could be proven, out-of-wedlock status of the child would
not necessarily preclude inheritance standing alone.
When a decedent bequeaths property to a posthumously con-
ceived child, a further obstacle arises in the form of the common
law Rule Against Perpetuities. The Rule Against Perpetuities
was intended to prevent gifts that would not vest in a particular
person until some remote time in the future.37 9 According to this
rule, a gift must vest no later than the end of the life of "a person
in being" plus twenty-one years. 380 While this rule could pose
problems for cloning, it would likely be transcended in the case of
posthumously conceived children by using the life of the surviv-
ing spouse or designated surrogate mother as the "measuring
life."3 81 The Restatement Second agrees, and further allows an
immediate or postponed gift to an as yet unconceived child as
3 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114, 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998) ("[A] person.., is the
child of [its] parents, regardless of their marital status. The parent and child rela-
tionship may be established under the [Uniform Parentage Act]."). This section also
provides an alternative subsection (2) provision, for states that have not adopted the
Uniform Parentage Act, which allows the parent child relationship to be established
either by a showing that the parents participated in a marriage ceremony, whether
or not void, or if paternity is established through adjudication. See id.; see also
WAGGONER, supra note 376, at 133 ("[The law has come full circle. The general
principle of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code is that an individual inherits from and
through her or his biological parents regardless of their marital status.").
39 See BIGELOW, supra note 374, at 96-97 (detailing the history and reasoning
behind the Rule Against Perpetuities); WAGGONER, supra note 376, at 984, (provid-
ing a colorful description).
380 See BIGELOW, supra note 374, at 96 ("[A] gift is in perpetuity, and hence in-
valid, when the interest given is so given that it might possibly not vest until after
the expiration of a life or lives in being and twenty-one years and a fraction-the pe-
riod of gestation.") (footnote omitted); WAGGONER, supra note 376, at 986 ("The
common-law perpetuity period is defined as a life in being plus 21 years. The period
can be extended by one or more periods of gestation, but only when an actual preg-
nancy makes the extension necessary."). For a statutory rule against perpetuities, see
UNIF. ACT ON INTESTACY, WILLS, AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 901, 8B U.L.A. 138
(1993) (including an additional restriction that "the interest either vests or termi-
nates within 90 years after its creation").
381 The "measuring life" is the "life in being" that is tied to whether the testa-
mentary distribution is valid. See WAGGONER, supra note 376, at 987-88. "For a life
to be a 'measuring life,' the person must satisfy the requirement of initial certainty,
which means that there must be a causal connection between the person's death and
the vesting or termination of the interest no later than 21 years thereafter." Id. (foot-
note omitted).
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long as there are no other members of the class "children" alive
at the time of the gift.3 82
The 120-hour rule will also need to be addressed. According
to the Uniform Probate Code, adopted in many states, if a pro-
posed heir does not survive a decedent by at least 120 hours, the
beneficiary is treated as having predeceased the decedent and is
not an heir for purposes of intestate succession.383 This would
mean that a posthumously conceived child could never take as an
heir, but only as a devisee. Although this is a practical rule that
helps in situations where a beneficiary's unforeseen death would
otherwise frustrate a decedent's wishes,38 4 it was not designed to
prevent unborn children from inheriting.3 5 This rule could pre-
vent posthumously conceived children from inheriting from their
deceased parent in situations where the parent died unexpect-
edly, without having made an express provision for the child. It
could also arise when the parent simply did not contemplate that
he or she must specifically bequeath property to that child, be-
38 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 26.1 (1988), (Gift Immediate in
Form to a Class-When Class Closes to Alter-Conceived and After-Adopted Persons)
providing-
If a gift that is immediate in form is made in favor of a class described as
"children," "grandchildren," "brothers," "sisters," "nephews," "nieces,"
"cousins," "issue," "descendants," "family," or by similar class gift terms,
then, unless a contrary intent of the donor is found from additional lan-
guage or circumstances,
(1)such disposition excludes a person within the primary meaning of the
class gift term who is conceived or adopted after the effective date of the
dispositive instrument, if on that date there is a class member, or a substi-
tute for a class member, available to take under the gift; and
C2)if there is no class member, or no substitute for a class member, avail-
able to take under the gift on that date, such disposition does not exclude
any person who is within the primary meaning of the class gift term on the
ground that he or she was conceived or adopted too late.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 26.2 (1988), (Gilt Postponed in
Form to a Class-When Class Closes to After-Conceived and Alter-Adopted Persons)
(emphasis added).
3s3 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-104, 8 U.L.A. 84 (1998); see also UNIF. ACT ON
INTESTACY, WILLS, AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 104, 702, 8B U.LA. 20.
384 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-104 comment, 8 U.L.A. 84 (1983) (explaining
that this provision is meant to avoid "multiple administrations and in some in-
stances preventO the property from passing to persons not desired by the decedent,"
in cases of common disaster).
38 See id. (noting that this section is "a limited version of the type of clause fre-
quently found in wills to take care of the common accident situation, in which sev-
eral members of the same family are injured and die within a few days of one an-
other").
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lieving that a gift to "children" will suffice, or in a situation like
the one in Hecht, where the decedent clearly makes his inten-
tions known but they are resolutely contested by his existing
children. In addition, if a decedent made a gift specifically to a
posthumously conceived child and the class "children," instead of
dividing the gift, it could, theoretically, go to the posthumously
conceived child for life with the class members being entitled to a
remainder interest, thus possibly circumventing the decedent's
wishes.386
The most often cited, and most practical and persuasive ar-
guments against sanctioning the birth of posthumously conceived
children, apart from the ethical dilemmas, are: that it will in-
definitely tie-up estates, require excessive litigation in otherwise
straight-forward probate cases, and freeze-up usable assets that
would need to be set aside for the contingent child.387 While
these are all valid concerns, state-sponsored administrative laws
of convenience, which relate to procreation decisions, are ordi-
narily upheld only if they slightly infringe on fundamental rights
and "further a compelling state interest in the least restrictive
way."388 Facilitating less-complicated probate decisions will al-
386 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 28.3 (Beneficiaries of Gift De-
scribed as Named Individual and Named Individual's "Children" or "Issue") provid-
ing:
If a gift is made to a named individual and a class described as the "chil-
dren" or "issue" of the named individual, or by a similar class gift term, in
the absence of additional language or circumstances that indicate other-
wise,
(1)the named individual is entitled to a life interest in the subject matter of
the gift; and
(2) the class members are entitled to a remainder interest in the subject
matter of the gift.
Id.
387 See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4 comment,
9B U.L.A. 197 (Supp. 1999) ("[This provision] is designed primarily to avoid the
problems of intestate succession which could arise if the posthumous use of a per-
son's genetic material could lead to the deceased being termed a parent.");
WARNOCK, supra note 39, at 55; Mika & Hurst, supra note 42, at 1018-19 (noting
that these "fears" should stimulate timely legislation, not inhibit it); Shah, supra
note 20, at 559, 571 (noting that few states have addressed these probate issues).
388 Andrews, supra note 4, at 401. Under this standard, a recent Louisiana law
requiring physicians to register embryos would likely fail, even under the Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth exception for limited record-keeping, because of "its burden-
some nature and lack of a valid connection with a health purpose." Id.
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most certainly fail as sufficient to violate the fundamental rights
of privacy and procreation under the United States Constitution.
D. United States Supreme Court Decisions
The United States Supreme Court will not ordinarily involve
itself in family, reproductive technology, and probate issues un-
less a state enacts and attempts to enforce a statute with ques-
tionable constitutional validity.389 Since state legislation in the
area of children conceived through artificially assisted reproduc-
tion is somewhat limited and virtually nonexistent for posthu-
mously conceived children, the Supreme Court has not passed
judgment on these issues. Taken together, however, there exists
some relevant precedent in related areas that could predict how
the Supreme Court might come out.
In 1980, the Supreme Court announced in Diamond v. Chak-
rabarty,3 90 a 5-4 decision, that living organisms "manufactured"
or "manipulated" by a researcher are property that can be pat-
ented.391 In the eighteen years since Chakrabarty was decided,
cells of foreign tribesmen in rainforests have been patented,3 92
Mr. Moore's hairy-cell leukemia cells have been patented,393 and
an American biotechnology company has been granted a patent
that identifies a gene known to produce breast cancer.394 It is
now being argued that simply "discovering" a human gene should
be enough for a patent.395 All of this would seem to suggest that
3S9 See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people."). Since these issues are not expressly delegated to the
federal government, under the Erie doctrine, the federal courts must apply state law
in deciding these issues, unless a federal question, such as constitutionality of the
statute, is raised. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
390 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
391 See id. at 309-10.
392 See Charles J. Hanley, Patent on Blood Cells Sparks Bioethical Debate: Case
of 'Genetic Colonialism' Offers an Example of How the Technology of Tomorrow Often
Outwits the Society of Today, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 21, 1996, at A24, available
in 1996 WL 7023553.
393 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Ca., 793 P.2d 479, 482 (Cal. 1990) (in
banc).
394 See Richard Colbey, Can You Patent Genes?, THE GUARDIAN, July 24, 1997,
A6, available in1997 WL 2392596.
395 See id. (noting that the European Parliament has passed a directive that
permits patents of genetic discoveries); cf Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (finding that
organisms not found in nature are patentable).
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there are categories of living, human cells which can be deemed
property, and even profitable. Even Justice Brennan in his dis-
sent in Chakrabarty did not express concern about the possibility
of treating a living organism as property in certain circumstances
for certain purposes, but instead, focused on the damage that
could ensue from the monopolization of living organisms to the
exclusive profit of an individual or a company.396 Chakrabarty,
interpreted in the context of state and federal laws prohibiting
the sale or inheritance of certain human body parts,397 would ap-
pear to stand for the proposition that while selling a limb or an
organ is not permissible, there are some types of human material
that can carry with it at least limited property rights.
It would not be a stretch to surmise that the unique proper-
ties of gametes would lead the Supreme Court, like the lower
courts that have addressed the issue,398 to decide that a property
right exists because of the individual's significant interest in the
fate of the gametes and the body's ability to regenerate them. Al-
though an embryo raises more complicated moral questions, the
Supreme Court, based on an analysis of prior decisions,39 would
probably find that the gamete providers have the most signifi-
cant right to "control" the fate of the embryos, even if the Court
declines to include them in the category of "property."40° The re-
396 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Tatents on the
processes by which he has produced and employed the new living organism are not
contested. The only question we need decide is whether Congress... intended that
he be able to secure a monopoly on the living organism itself, no matter how pro-
duced or how used."). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Pow-
ell, then went on to discuss the role of patent law in helping to balance progress with
monopolies. See id. at 319.
397 See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10, 8A U.L.A. 58 (1993) (stating that
selling body parts to be removed on death is a felony); c.f id. at § 3 (intimating that
there must be some inherited property right by allowing certain categories of rela-
tives to make "an anatomical gift of all or a part of the decedent's body" as long as he
did not make an unrevoked refusal to donate prior to death).
398 See, e.g., Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993); Davis v. Davis,
842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
399 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 527 (1942).
400 Property, as traditionally defined, is:
That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclu-
sively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are
guaranteed and protected by the government. The term is said to extend to
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sult would be that removing embryos from a fertility clinic,
leaving sperm to a loved one, or even selling gametes and possi-
bly embryos, could be found permissible under Supreme Court
precedent.
In the case of Babbitt v. Youpee,40 1 the Supreme Court struck
down a federal statute that regulated how and when a Native
American testator may bequeath his rights in property located on
a reservation.4 2 As indicated above, the Supreme Court is sel-
dom called upon to settle probate issues, but this case involved a
federal statute that the Supreme Court deemed to be in violation
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.403 The Court
found that the Indian Land Consolidation Act ("ILCA"), which
required that certain fractional interests in land escheat to the
tribe upon the death of the current owner, effected a taking with-
out just compensation because it limited the testator's ability to
transfer property at death.40 4 Babbitt came ten years after Hodel
v. Irving,40 5 which had struck down the predecessor to the cur-
rent ILCA,406 and reinforced the Supreme Court's position that
statutes prohibiting a testator's ability to bequeath his property
must walk a fine line not to be deemed a "taking."40 7 Therefore, if
posthumously conceived children can overcome the Rule Against
every species of valuable right and interest. More specifically, ownership;
the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing, the right to dispose of a
thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude every one
else from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use or
disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or sub-
jects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). See generally Mika
& Hurst, supra note 42, at 1007 (asserting that "decisional authority" is in the gam-
ete providers-at least to the extent of an effect on the reproductive autonomy).
401 519 U.S. 234 (1997).
402 See id. at 237.
403 See id.
404 See id. The Court further found that the statute "amounted to the 'virtua[l
abrogation of the right [of a decedent] to pass on a certain type of property' [to a de-
visee] ... [and] could not be upheld." Id. at 240 (quoting Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704, 716 (1987)). The Court also noted that the Ninth Circuit had found that the fed-
eral statute " 'continue[d] to completely abolish one of the sticks in the bundle of
rights [constituting property].' " Id. at 242 (alterations in original). Finally, the
Court denounced the current version of the statute because it "severely restricts the
right of an individual to direct the descent of his property... [and] shrinks drasti-
cally the universe of possible successors." Id. at 244-45.
405 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
406 See id. at 734.
407 See Babbit, 519 U.S. at 237, 240, 242, 244-45.
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Perpetuities and the 120-hour probate code requirement, statutes
that limit a decedent parent's ability to bequeath property to a
posthumously conceived child, or possibly even statutes that ex-
clude those children from being classified as "heirs," may fail a
due process evaluation by the Supreme Court.
Finally, the right for consenting parties to have posthu-
mously conceived children and the right to provide for those chil-
dren presumably falls under the fundamental rights of privacy
and procreation.408 Beginning with Skinner v. Oklahoma4°9 and
later in the landmark cases of Griswold v. Connecticut410 and Roe
v. Wade411 and its progeny, the Supreme Court has continued to
develop and define these fundamental constitutional rights of
privacy and procreation.412 The parameters and standards for
these rights were somewhat modified in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,413 but ultimately, the prior
48 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.... [But]
the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution ....
These decisions make it clear... that the right has some extensions to ac-
tivities relating to marriage... procreation... contraception... family
relations.., and child rearing and education.
Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the indi-
vidual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child."). But see Dame Mary Donaldson, The Control of Reproductive Research, in
REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE AND THE LAW 157 (A. Allan Templeton & D. Cusine eds.,
1990) ("I sometimes question whether it is every woman's inalienable right to have a
child regardless of the means used to produce it and whether the future welfare of
any baby is not paramount to this wish.").
409 316 U.S. 527 (1942) (striking down an Oklahoma statute that allowed for the
sterilization of convicts guilty of prior crimes of "moral turpitude," and in so doing,
establishing marriage and procreation as fimdamental rights protected under the
Constitution).
410 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut statute prohibiting the sale
of contraceptives even to married persons and establishing the "zone of privacy" that
attaches to various guarantees in the Bill of Rights).
411 410 U.S. 113 (striking down a Texas statute forbidding abortion and widen-
ing the privacy and procreation rights to include the right of a woman to have con-
trol over her body).
412 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438; Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Skinner, 316
U.S. 527.
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decisions were not disturbed.414 Even given the divided court in
Casey415 and the conservative leaning of the current Supreme
Court, it is certainly arguable that any statute that attempts to
notably limit the availability of reproductive assistance or to re-
strict when or how a child may be conceived or provided for,
might be held to the strict scrutiny standard,416 a test few stat-
utes pass. 417 Casey involved abortion, an issue that has splin-
tered the Court in the past because of the underlying moral im-
plications, 418 whereas conception of a child with a loved one after
413 505 U.S. 833 (upholding the rights of privacy and procreation espoused in
Roe but altering the test in abortion cases that determines when the state's interest
outweighs the woman's).
414 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
[Tihe essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again
reaffirmed.... Roe is clearly in no jeopardy, since subsequent constitu-
tional developments have neither disturbed, nor do they threaten to di-
minish, the scope of recognized protection accorded to the liberty relating to
intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to
beget or bear a child .... [Olur cases since Roe accord with Roe's view that
a State's interest in the protection of life falls short of justifying any ple-
nary override of individual liberty claims.
Id. at 857.
415 Justice O'Connor wrote the Court's opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Souter. Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Blackmun
concurred in part, concurred in the judgment, and dissented in part (dissenting on
the alteration of the Roe test for competing interests). Chief Justice Renquist, joined
by Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, concurred in the judgment in part and dis-
sented in part (acknowledging that a woman has a right to have an abortion, but
that the state may do everything in its power to dissuade her). Justice Scalia, joined
by Chief Justice Renquist and Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment in part
and dissented in part (dissenting on the Court's decision not to overturn Roe). See
Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
416 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 ("[Where] certain 'fundamental rights' are in-
volved.... regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling
state interest' and.., legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express
only the legitimate state interest at stake."); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541-42; see also
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
417 See Andrews, supra note 4, at 400 (noting that Louisiana's law bestowing
personhood on embryos would only be constitutional if it "furthered a compelling
state interest in the least restrictive manner possible"); Mika & Hurst, supra note
42, at 1005-06.
418 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (5-4 majority striking
down 2-parent notification for abortion, but different 5-4 majority upholding 2-
parent notification with judicial bypass); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
492 U.S. 490 (1989) (5-4 majority upholding state statute prohibiting abortion in cer-
tain circumstances); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Four Justices agreeing
with the Court's opinion to uphold the Hyde Amendment and deny Medicaid funds
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an unfortunate or unexpected death usually does not raise simi-
lar dilemmas.419
Cases involving assisted conception and posthumously con-
ceived children are almost certain to eventually reach the Su-
preme Court since they deal with constitutional issues that are
intrinsic, e.g., the fundamental rights of privacy and procreation
and takings under the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause,
which lower courts have not yet adequately addressed.
IV. DEVELOPING RELIABLE, MANAGEABLE, EQUITABLE STATUTES
Children who are conceived after one or both of their parents
are deceased could face difficult personal and emotional chal-
lenges. 420 The problem is compounded because the current state
of law leaves their legal status uncertain.421 Also relevant is the
reality that posthumously conceived children could be the final
opportunity to conceive a child with a loved one, with whom con-
ception had not been possible in life. Moreover, with so many
Americans battling infertility, it is likely that legal issues associ-
ated with reproductive technology will only grow.
It is submitted that the common law developing around
these issues, with an occasional ad hoc statute, is not sufficient to
provide individuals and families with adequate guidance to com-
fortably plan for their future or to assert their rights upon the
sudden death of a loved one.422 Therefore, comprehensive and
flexible legislation is needed in every state to provide courts and
individuals with notice of the rights and responsibilities arising
for abortions, three dissenting, and one concurring in the holding but not the opin-
ion).
419 See Andrews, supra note 4, at 404 ("Unlike women undergoing abortions, the
goal of the couples undertaking medically-assisted reproduction is to have a child.").
420 See Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 288 (Ct. App. 1993) (acknowledging
that some "commentators" have argued that posthumously conceived children may
have psychological difficulties dealing with the fact that they were conceived using
the sperm of a dead man). See generally SCOTT, supra note 5, at 207-09 (discussing
the reasoning advanced for not informing children of the assisted conception and
raising arguments for disclosure).
421 See Mika & Hurst, supra note 42, at 1019 ("Currently, the legal status of the
posthumous child is as uncertain as the definitive circumstances in which a posthu-
mous child is allowed to be born.").
422 See DOLGIN, supra note 20, at 182 ("[The cases to date] illustrate the deep
confusions and inconsistencies in the law's response at present to the possibilities
that reproductive technology occasions.").
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from assisted reproductive technology, particularly when the pro-
cedure produces a posthumously conceived child.
The UPA is a start, but it is too narrowly drawn and does not
address posthumously conceived children. The USCACA is well-
intentioned and arguably upholds the decedent's Roe right to re-
productive autonomy,423 however, it appears to run afoul of the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Babbitt, that due process can be
violated by state or federal restrictions that prevent the distribu-
tion of an estate in conformance with the decedent's wishes, and
the Restatement Second's definition of "heir." To resolve this
situation the USCACA could incorporate language similar to the
UPA, stating that all children can inherit as long as paternity
can be proven in conformance with the standards set out in the
Uniform Paternity Act. Alternatively, the rule could be narrowed
by including a requirement that the decedent's intent to parent a
posthumously conceived child be proven, either expressly or im-
pliedly. Although cases like Hecht raise questions about undue
influence, sound mind, and other suspect factors, the majority of
cases will probably be more like the heart-wrenching Parpalaix
case, in which, it should be remembered, no instructions for dis-
tribution of the sperm were left. These proposed statutes could
be worded so as to require clear evidence of intent and consent,
thereby preventing fraud and unwanted posthumous conceptions,
while protecting the rights of those survivors who genuinely want
these children.
In addition to these changes in family law, alterations to the
state probate codes will be necessary. The changes would need to
include posthumously conceived children as members within the
definition of "children" in situations where the decedent's intent
to parent such children is clear. An exception to the 120-hour re-
quirement would also be needed for children born under these
circumstances. Current probate code sections that set out when
and how a minor is to be represented at a probate hearing will
need to include specific provisions for posthumously conceived
children.424 Possibly, the surviving spouse or recipient of the
423 But see Mika & Hurst, supra note 42, at 1017-18 (arguing that the USCACA
infringes on gamete providers' constitutional protection over procreation decisions).
42A If both donors died but they had specified a "guardian" or if, for whatever
reason, the surviving partner cannot represent the posthumously conceived child's
interests, a conservator of the child's interest could be appointed.
1999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
gametes or embryos could represent the unborn child's interests
at these hearings.
Finally, provisions will need to be formulated on how to pro-
bate the estate while protecting any posthumously conceived
child's interest. This is the most difficult issue because in many
situations it is not known how many, if any, posthumously con-
ceived children will be born. This section of the statute could
authorize retention of a certain percentage of the estate for a cer-
tain number of years in some form of a trust. A formula could be
developed that would take into consideration the expected num-
ber of posthumously conceived children, based either on the de-
cedent's wishes or the technological likelihood of conception given
the circumstances (e.g., amount of reproductive material avail-
able and fertility of the living partner). This formula would also
need to counterbalance the number of living children and the fi-
nancial responsibilities of the decedent. It may be necessary to
give the courts a certain amount of discretion to balance these in-
terests. If no child is born within the specified period, that por-
tion would revert back to the estate and could be distributed
among the heirs in accordance with their position at the time of
the original probating of the will.
Legislative guidance must also be provided for determining
when and whether reproductive material is property, more than
property, or when it might be deemed to have independent rights
necessitating individual consideration. State legislatures must
clarify who has rights to sperm, ova, and embryos and under
what circumstances those rights shift. These clarifications could
appear in the definition section of the state probate codes, defin-
ing gametes and embryos as "interim property," capable of being
bequeathed; in state property laws that declare who owns gam-
etes and embryos, under what circumstances, and how they can
be transferred; and/or in the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act425 (as
adopted by the states),426 explaining the circumstances and re-
quirements that permit the transfer of gametes or embryos.
425 For example, a provision outlining when and how a decedent would be per-
mitted to leave gametes or embryos could be added to UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §
6, 8A U.L.A. 53 (1993) ("Persons Who May Become Donees; Purposes for Which Ana-
tomical Gifts may be Made").
42 See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-601 to 20-17-617 (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 7150 to 7157 (Deering 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-
279a to 19a-280a (1988); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 327-1 to 327-14 (Michie 1996);
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Although it is likely that these issues will need to be covered
in various sections of the state code, such as probate law, domes-
tic relations law, and gift law that resolve the issues by refer-
encing each other, a statute could be enacted which would en-
compass most aspects of these issues. Such a statute might
approximate the following:
(a) All children who were conceived from the genetic material of
an individual, living or deceased at the time of conception, will
be the "children" of that individual, except:
When the decedent had made his or her intention not to
beget children posthumously evident, provable either by
sufficient witness testimony or by having signed a state-
ment representing this intent was either witnessed or no-
tarized;
When the decedent had made repeated attempts, prior to
his or her death, to obtain possession of and destroy all
reproductive material which was being stored;
When the decedent had relinquished all rights to the re-
productive material he or she had stored, either by sign-
ing a contract so stating with a fertility clinic, research fa-
cility, sperm bank or any other organization which stores
and/or uses reproductive material or by demanding ano-
nymity of status as a donor;
When the decedent had entered into an agreement to pro-
vide reproductive material solely for the purpose of re-
search;
When the decedent had entered into an agreement with
private individuals, not falling under section 3 above, for
the sole purpose of providing reproductive material to as-
sist those individuals in their separate attempt to con-
ceive a child;
IDAHO CODE §§ 39-3401 to 39-3417 (1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 525.921 to 525.9224
(West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-17-101 to 72-17-312 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 451.500 to 451.590 (Michie 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.2-01 to 23-
06.2-12 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-18.6-1 to 23-18.6-15 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§26-28-1 to 26-28-12 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 5238 to 5247 (1990); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-289 to 32.1-297.1 (Michie 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
68.50.520 to 68.50.630, 68.50.901 to 68.50.903 (West 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
157.06 (West 1990).
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When the genetic material or gamete was taken from the
decedent after death or while unconscious without the de-
cedent having previously made clear his or her intention
that such a procedure be performed in such an event.
(b) The burden of proof, clear and convincing evidence,
will be on those individuals who are attempting to estab-
lish parentage to show that none of the above exceptions
existed, except in the case of probate, in which case the
burden is on decedent's estate to prove one of the above
exceptions existed.
All posthumously conceived children of a decedent, as deter-
mined by section (a) will be deemed children for all applicable
probate codes provided they are born alive within 10 years of de-
cedent's death. Any posthumously conceived child born after
that 10-year period will be barred from asserting rights against
any asset of decedent's estate not specifically bequeathed to him
or her.
A "posthumously conceived child" means any child who is
created from the gamete of the decedent and another after the
decedent's death or an embryo which had been created using the
decedent's gamete and the gamete of another but had not yet
been implanted at the time of decedent's death or a child created
from the genetic material of the decedent.
While a person is alive, he or she has preeminent right of
control over his or her reproductive material, whether inside or
outside of the body, unless the person has signed a contract re-
linquishing all rights to the material to either a private individ-
ual or organization.
Reproductive material, including embryos, is neither prop-
erty in the traditional sense, nor a person, but shall be deemed to
occupy an interim category allowing for some state regulation but
not prohibition of sale, bequeathal or donation.
An individual may bequeath his or her stored gametes and
when there has been attempts in the recent past, within the last
3 years absent an illness that could have precluded further at-
tempts within those 3 years, a spouse or partner may claim the
stored gametes. If a living spouse, not separated from the dece-
dent prior to his or her death, requests that the gametes of the
deceased spouse be removed for future attempts at conception
the hospital will promptly remove and store either 10 eggs or 10
vials of sperm, at the expense of the living spouse. A court will
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then determine whether it was in line with the deceased spouse's
intent that posthumous children be conceived, either giving the
living spouse the gametes or having them destroyed.
An embryo created but not yet implanted at the time of the
death of one of the gamete providers falls under the complete
control of the other living gamete provider unless that individual
has relinquished control under sections (a) or (c), at which point,
the embryo is controlled by the surviving spouse or partner of the
deceased gamete provider or if none exists, then the fertility
clinic, research facility or other organization storing the embryo
at the time of decedent's death.
If there has been assisted reproduction attempts to conceive
with the partner, any other family member, other than a spouse
or partner, will not be given authority over gametes or embryos
of their deceased family member unless the decedent expresses
such a desire in a will or notarized statement and was of sound
mind at the time the statement or will was made.
An individual may specify in a will to whom he or she wishes
to give his or her gametes or embryos, if the other gamete pro-
vider is either deceased or has relinquished control.
The courts will retain their ability to sit in equity to fairly
resolve situations that do not fit within this statute, so as to ad-
just for new and changing assisted reproduction techniques.
The courts have valiantly tackled these issues on a case-by-
case basis.427 Some state legislatures have adopted the UPA and
the USCACA and have added or amended their provisions to re-
spond to these situations. The courts, however, will be forced to
resolve a constant stream of first impression cases that tread
dangerously close to constitutionally protected rights without
real legislative guidance; the UPA is not nearly comprehensive
enough, the USCACA forfeits some essential rights and require-
ments of parenthood in favor of consistency, and the other ad hoc
statutes in existence are generally, either limited or collateral.428
427 See DOLGIN, supra note 20, at 176 (calling the courts the "laboratory" for the
legislatures, providing them with results that may later be reviewed in creating the
statutes which must ultimately come to pass).
428 See id. at 177 (remarking that state statutes dealing with custody and par-
entage were not helpful in cases of assisted reproduction because they were out-
dated).
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If the state legislatures continue to hesitate in addressing
these issues, the Congress will need to step in. Since reproduc-
tive technology is now a billion-dollar industry in America,42
Congress can almost certainly legislate on issues related to it
through its Commerce .Clause power.430 The threat of such leg-
islation may be enough to spur the states into motion-goading
them to enact laws on the status of reproductive material and the
fate of posthumously conceived children.431
CONCLUSION
Practical, comprehensive, flexible, and standard laws will
need to be developed to provide the necessary guidelines to give
parents, doctors, and fertility clinics/sperm banks a reasonable
opportunity to provide for posthumously conceived children.
While the federal government ordinarily leaves such issues to the
states, if the states are not providing for such children or are de-
nying them their due inheritance, federal intervention will be
necessary to protect these children's rights. These statutes must,
however, balance the interests of the parents and children with
the administrative necessities of being able to probate a will in a
reasonable amount of time, as well as all the other state adminis-
trative functions that require the state to be able to ascertain
parentage.
In addition, the rights of a decedent to devise property freely,
as well as the constitutional right to procreate or choose not to
procreate, must be carefully considered and defended. The
USCACA's attempt to provide a simple unconditional answer to
429 See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT Prefatory
Note, 9B U.L.A. 192 (Supp. 1999) ("An estimated one billion dollars was spent by
Americans in the year of 1987 on medical care to combat infertility."); Peres, supra
note 55, at 1 (estimating that presently, Americans spend $2 billion dollars per year
on fertility treatments).
430 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States... ."); see
also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Houston, East
& West Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
431 The ABA has recognized the significance and need for prompt action in this
area. Their committee on reproduction is presently drafting a model bill to deal with
the spectrum of reproductive law issues that are currently unanswered or causing
confusion in the courts and society. See Peres, supra note 55, at 1.
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the issue of inheritance in these situations is commendable but
appears to deny the decedent, the surviving parent, and the
posthumously conceived child of their substantive due process
protection. A more versatile standard should be developed, ac-
companied by well-developed guidelines to assist judges in mak-
ing fair decisions and allowing parents to plan with confidence,
knowing that their wishes will be carried out.
In a society that values the individual's rights of privacy and
procreation so highly, where questions on abortion have caused
severe internal strife, where single-parents abound, and where so
many millions of Americans face trouble conceiving a child, it
seems unthinkable that we would unilaterally restrict the rights
a person has in his or her own reproductive material and in the
freedom to decide when and how to have children. Instead of
being scarred for life, these children could certainly grow-up bet-
ter adjusted than "the kid next door," embraced by the love of a
parent who went to great lengths to have them and the knowl-
edge that they were unquestionably wanted.
Stacey Sutton
1999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
932
